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i 
i Abstracts 
Elkem Materials is in an Equity Joint Venture with Erdos in Inner Mongolia producing 
microsilica for the global market. Elkem Materials is considering several options for their 
future strategy in China. The business environment of the Chinese market is very different 
from those of any other emerging market, or any other market for that matter.  Knowledge 
of these differences may create new opportunities for foreign companies such as Elkem 
Materials. Opportunities in four different strategic modes are considered in a performance 
perspective and for a set of identified factors of importance to Elkem Materials. These 
factors are affected by both the external and internal environment Elkem Materials is 
operating in. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Do for your business what makes sense in China today,  
not what might have made sense for some other company years ago.”   
Dan P. Harris, Harris & Moure Law Firm 2006
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1 
1 Introduction 
Elkem Materials Co Ltd. (Elkem M) and their parent Elkem AS (Elkem) is facing an 
increased competition on the global market of microsilica mostly from new entrants and 
competitors in China, but also some increased production in Europe, Middle-East and 
Africa. The production of microsilica is assumed to have increased by 90 % the last year 
(Figure 3) during the financial crisis. The demand situation seems to remain unchanged and 
hence the demand/supply ratio creates a fierce price competition. And was it not for long 
term supply contracts, Elkem M might have been forced to join the competition and 
reduced prices of microsilica. Analysts have estimated that the firm might have to reduce 
their prices as much as 18-20% in the near future to keep their global market shares of 
approximately 33-35% if the demand is unchanged
1
. 
The perspective of the report is performance for Elkem M and Elkem regards to their China 
operations. The aim is to evaluate performance potential in four different strategic modes. 
The starting point is the present model with their 50/50 Equity International Joint Venture 
(EIJV) with Erdos Metallurgy Co Ltd, Inner Mongolia (Erdos). The notion performance 
includes the concepts of long term return of investments and strategic position. 
The report is considering four strategic modes, ranging from Market Agreement (MA), 
EIJVs, Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) registered company to WOFE mode, and 
considerations on how each of the modes might change the current performance of Elkem 
M‟s China operations. Considering this wide range of modes, from non-equity to equity 
modes from both ends of the scale of commitment and control, requires a broad approach to 
assess the possible potential outcomes of each of the modes. At the end of the day it is the 
actual long term total return, less all costs, that matters. Strategic considerations should, 
however, be made on a regular basis as explained in chapters 0 and 5. Though some 
strategic variables stay reasonably stable over time, others will need constant considerations 
and monitoring, especially in the Chinese business environment which might seem to be 
highly volatile and competitive. 
The most recent information provided by Elkem M early December 2009, led to a redesign 
of the structure of this report. 
                                                 
1
 Information from Elkem December 2009 
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Furthermore, there have been major changes in the parameters determining opportunities, 
options and risks for Norwegian companies investing in China only the last few months. 
Norway and China is due to sign a trade agreement and this might open opportunities for 
Elkem and along with these opportunities, other challenges than this report initially where 
intended to emphasise. 
This chapter will in the following introduce the problem statement as originally described 
by Jon Meland spring 2008 and further, my observations done in phone interviews and  
e-mail communication with Erik Bergsmo and Ottar Lærum. Let there be no doubt that 
Elkem possess more than sufficient competence to assess these challenges within the 
present organisation, but the interviews conducted with the three have revealed indications 
to where added focus and efforts could be put to possibly give Elkem M some information 
on where to re-assess their current situation The latter, emphasising that this report is based 
from an outsider viewpoint and therefore the insider perspective should by no means be 
excluded. Last the rationale and purpose of the report is outlined. 
Chapter 2 is describing the current situation for Elkem M in China to picture the 
information received from various sources, included information provided by Elkem M and 
an overview over some of the inter-connected companies in the networks in Inner 
Mongolia. Next, in chapter 3, the theoretical framework and considerations used to solve 
the problem statement are introduced including the tool used for the analysis in chapter 5. 
Some basic considerations are put into the generic frame briefly mentioned in chapter 1.2 
merely as a mean to enable a better foundation for the analysis tool. Chapter 4 introduce 
and discuss elements important to consider in the analysis. The last subchapter in chapter 4 
includes four real cases, two success EIJVs and two „failed EIJVs. To what extent one of 
them can be described a failure, is another matter. The PESTEL analysis is conducted in 
chapter 5 and will assess 6 strategic dimensions using a SWOT analysis for each dimension. 
Chapter 6 follows with discussion based on the SWOT framework and chapter 7 
summarising based on the previous analysis and discussions. The latter chapter is a short 
executive summary. Last, in chapter 7 limitations of this report and suggestions for further 
analysis is given. 
The performance perspective is considered across the four strategic modes that limits the 
scope of the report.   
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1.1 Problem Statement 
Based on the information given by Elkem and Elkem M and information gathered from 
other sources, this problem statement aim to identifying variables that might have special 
relevance to the challenges Elkem M has identified as their current main concerns in their 
Chinese operations. This information is put in a context where investment and operational 
safeguarding options are considered in three different strategic modes, and compared to 
Elkem M‟s current strategic mode, regards to the performance perspective, i.e. factors that 
might be important to give special attention in a strategic evaluation today, to increase the 
probability for long term future maximization of performance and profits. 
The first strategic mode, BM1
2
 is the current structure in China, which is to continue the 
current ownership in the Erdos EIJV (Erdos-Elkem) and further invest in the company, 
however accepting that Erdos becomes Elkem M‟s largest supplier. BM2 contain two parts. 
First, Elkem M changes the ownership structure in the EIJV by selling shares and finally 
withdraws from Erdos-Elkem. Second, Elkem M negotiates an MA with Erdos and search 
for other smaller EIJV partners (melting plants) in other provinces of China. Two more 
option is suggested as possible strategic modes in the future for Elkem M in China, an SSE 
registered company, BM3, and last a WOFE melting plant and microsilica production, 
BM4. In both the latter strategic modes one or several MAs is included as part of the 
strategic mode. 
The questions Elkem M request evaluated are: How to implement a Western strategy 
mindset in Erdos-Elkem; How to utilize Chinese flexibility and adaptability; How to best 
lobby in China; How to protect their Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) in China and last 
consider the effect of the parent companies size differences. The latter, accepting that Erdos 
becomes Elkem M‟s largest supplier, has been expressed as a major concern to Elkem M 
due to fear that the size difference might be a problem for their competitive advantage over 
time. Partner size dissimilarities can be both a pro and con in a transaction cost view, Zhu. 
In this report the analysis is brought a step further, identifying other important partner 
dissimilarities and how they may improve and decrease performance. 
                                                 
2
 BM refers to Business Model as used by Zhu (2008) – All refernces to Zhu (2008) are from here and 
onwards referred to as Zhu 
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During the later communication some further issues has been determined to be of possible 
interest for Elkem M to study closer, i.e. the technical quality of the silicafume
3
 and the 
challenge with different firm cultures in Erdos and Elkem. Related to the latter, it has been 
mentioned that the quick decisions made by Erdos in Erdos-Elkem is a challenge to Elkem 
and Elkem M. As the size dissimilarities between the parents owners of Erdos-Elkem have 
been addressed as a possible problem to Elkem M in the EIJV, this issue is addressed by 
also considering other partner dissimilarities and their possible impact on the Erdos-Elkem 
performance potential (see chapter 4.5). 
The scope of this report is to look at the how performance might change between the 
current strategic mode, combined MAs and several EIJVs, SSE and WOFE.  
The strategic modes of analyse is: 
1. BM1 - Continue and develop the Erdos-Elkem EIJV 
2. BM2 -MA with Erdos and new partners in EIJVs 
3. BM3 - MA with Erdos and start an SSE company 
4. BM4 - MA with Erdos and invest in a WOFE 
Last, if Elkem M is to invest in one of the lawfully possible WOFE modes, the lack of 
sufficient educated work force has been addressed as a problem. It is however hard to see 
how the lack of competent labour can be solved by using the WOFE mode as compared to 
any of the other modes and this is discussed in particular in chapter 5.3. 
1.2 Rationale and Purpose - Performance Perspective 
Elkem present their strategy as: “Elkem pays great attention to strategic positions, change 
processes and product development, and is constantly realigning its product portfolio 
towards more customer-tailored solutions and towards business areas with stronger 
underlying growth. 
Elkem seeks long-term agreements and contracts throughout the value chain from raw 
materials to customers. This allows its products to be tailored to each customer‟s 
requirements, while providing more predictable financial results.”, Elkem (2010)4. 
                                                 
3
 Zhu p. 46 has not considered changes in total supply and quality of microsilica in her report.  
4
 Internet reference: Elkem. 
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After Elkem M indicated a possible new strategic mode in the near future this strategy 
statement became a natural starting point from where to rearrange the structure of this 
report and focus on performance, rather than risks. When considering several business 
models it seems that Elkem‟s ability to build and maintain relations to external stakeholders 
and improve internal processes seems to become more important to use a performance 
perspective, rather than transaction costs. Several partners are involved in Elkem M‟s 
operations in Inner Mongolia, from local, regional and central governments, inter-related 
firms, local communities, customers, etc. and Erdos EPM 
The notion „Performance‟ is in this report related to Elkem‟s ability to meet customer 
requirements as outlined in the strategy statement and to keep its position in the microsilica 
market, hence sustain an acceptable financial return. Performance is considered as a 
measure compared to Elkem and Elkem M‟s competitors in all their markets, thus 
considering opportunities to perform poorer, or better than the competitors. In a low net 
profit market environment (i.e. high supply over demand ratio) other factors decide whether 
Elkem can keep the strategic edge and sustain a long term competitive advantage in the 
global market. 
Orkla Materials is a business unit in Orkla and Elkem is part of this business unit as a 
wholly owned Orkla firm. Elkem has five core business areas: Solar, Silicon Materials 
(Elkem SM), Foundry Products, Carbon and Energy. Elkem M is a WOFE affiliate owned 
by Elkem in the business area of silicon materials and Elkem M is the legal entity with a 
50% ownership in Erdos-Elkem. This report is considering Elkem as a parent to Erdos-
Elkem and Orkla as the parent of Elkem. Corresponding, Erdos Electrical Power & 
Metallurgical Co., Ltd (Erdos EPM) is considered to be the other parent of Erdos-Elkem 
and Erdos Cashmere Group Co., Ltd. (Erdos CG) the parent of Erdos. Chapter 2 is 
providing more details on some of the complexity related to owner structures in the inter-
connected networks around the operations in Erdos Qipanjing Industrial Park in Inner 
Mongolia. 
The Elkem strategy statement show that strategic positions and predictable financial results 
are important to the firm, thus giving reason to discuss Elkem SM‟s market shares 
compared to changing demand/supply conditions and how the four different BMs impact 
performance under changing market conditions. 
 6 
In the following both possible configurations will be considered and according to the 
relevant laws, The Law of Security, Laws on Land Rights, etc., see e.g. MOFCOM (2010), 
Asia Law & Practice (2005) and Chen (2008), it is assumed that both configurations are 
possible in most regions of China with some local exceptions. Last, all equity modes are not 
allowed in state regulated industries according to the Security Laws, MOFCOM (2010) and 
Wolff (2008), however we know now that there are plans to ease restrictions in some state 
regulated industries for foreign direct investments (FDI) in an SSE strategic mode. WOFE 
seem more uncertain at present though and will most probably still be under strict 
conditions for foreign investors, FMPRC (2010) and China Daily (January 4, 2010). The 
WOFE mode is still considered, but it seems that it will be strict restrictions on 
organisational structures and the nationality distribution in the top management and work-
force of a registered WOFE. The latter is however yet to be decided by official bureaucratic 
entities. However, the WOFE mode seems to be harder, but still not impossible with the use 
of Chinese agents to acquire land use permits and permit to extract raw materials even 
under the current regime, see Wolff (2008) for structuring options in regulated industries. 
There are several laws and regulations to consider in this perspective, thus also all the 
different institutional environments in different regions in China, but there are available 
structures supported by legal framework to use a WOFE mode even in highly regulated 
industries. 
This report tries to identify areas where Elkem and Elkem M with affiliates can seek for 
improved performance, included safeguarding mechanisms, to mitigate risks in China. In 
other words; seek to reach better than average in industry performance and keep, and if 
possible, gain competitive advantages. This perspective is not dependent on costs, but rather 
the potential of increased net profit, though without excluding the cost perspective. 
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) is a widely accepted and considered by many 
researchers as a very good methodology to assess the challenge at hand, Standifird and 
Weinstein (2007), Henisz and Zelner (2004) and Williamson (1981). TCE is however also 
criticised by many to be applicable only in a company to company environment, see e.g. 
Coombs et al. (1996, pp. 5-9 and pp.172-174). Henisz and Zelner (2005) use TCE and add 
positive political theories and include judicial institutions in their considerations around 
TCE. Coombs et al. (1996) argues that transactions takes place more efficiently through the 
market place than within a firm unless rationality, asset specificity and opportunism coexist. 
Yamin (2006) claims asset specificity will change over time hence difficult to put in a TCE 
context. He argues that in a highly changing or uncertain environment the notion of asset 
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specificity would become somewhat ambiguous and the approach seems to be inconsistent 
with uncertainty. 
Other elements important to consider is how to specify the degree of asset specificity. The 
notion of asset specificity is considered to have several dimensions to it. Williamson, 
(1983) identifies four dimensions: First is Site Specificity, e.g. a natural resource available 
at a certain location and movable only at great or high cost, the second is Physical Asset 
Specificity, e.g. a specialised machine/tool designed or used for a single or specialised 
purpose. The third dimension is Human Asset Specificity, i.e., highly specialised human 
skills, arising in a „learning by doing‟ fashion which is related to the concept of transfer of 
tacit knowledge, particularly in an EIJV context. Finally he explains the Dedicated Assets 
dimension, i.e. a discrete investment in a plant that cannot readily be put to work for other 
purposes. Malone et al. (1987) have added the Time Specificity dimension, but this is 
related to delivery times to customers and is not considered relevant within the scope of 
Elkem‟s situation and the fact that produced microsilica can be transported and stored close 
to customers and the product is not subject to reduced quality if stored thus making this 
dimension inapplicable. Using the TCE approach complicates the picture when determining 
the exact impact, or value, of the aggregated asset specificity. On Site Specificity the value 
has been confirmed to be low by Elkem M. Physical asset specificity seems to be hard to 
put a value on. Physical assets can be sold, but probably not without some negative impact 
on the human asset specificity, emphasising the guanxi and trust elements in China and the 
quality of relations to political and bureaucratic institutions. The dedicated asset specificity 
seems to be considered of high importance by Elkem, but might in reality be perceived as 
equal to the physical dimension inside the scope of this report as both is related to 
production equipment designed for one, or a few particular purposes. 
Joskow (1988) points out that these different categories point to essentially the same 
phenomenon, but that it is instructive in empirical analyses to treat each category distinctly. 
Joskow's series of papers have looked at contract structuring in order to examine how 
contracts mitigate transaction costs inherent in a market based relationship. Zaheer and 
Venkatraman (1994) define Human asset specificity as asset specificity dealing with the 
degree to which skills, knowledge and experience of the agency's personnel are specific to 
the business process. In addition they add the dimension Procedural asset specificity, which 
incorporates notions of human asset specificity and refers to the degree that an agency's 
workflows and processes are customized to exploit the other party's capabilities. The latter 
 8 
brings the notion of opportunistic behaviour into the TCE approach and is here defined as a 
relation which one party uses the relationship to better their position, often at the expense of 
the other. 
Adding these notions of asset specificity up and it seems like close to impossible to find a 
value on asset specificity that can easily be related to a huge set of transactions in a network 
of stake-holders ranging from interconnected individuals, groups of people, firms and 
public entities. Adding all these transactions, included political and bureaucratic 
institutions, and it will be an expensive and time consuming task to perform an analysis 
based on transaction cost. 
Due to the multiple actors and network nature of all these models this report is based on a 
generic approach proposed by Peng (2009). He presents three main perspectives on global 
strategy, Figure 1: The Institutional Conditions (Institutional view), including regulatory 
institutions and the normative and cognitive institutions; the Competition within an Industry 
(Industry view) and the Resources and Capabilities available to a company (Resource 
view). His approach aim to make a framework for extended analysis of competitive factors 
that eventually will determine a 
company‟s performance in the global 
market. All these models include 
several transactions between several 
actors at any given point of time. This 
gives the reasoning for a more generic 
strategy approach to the challenge. The 
reality of global competition is 
however more complex and indistinct 
than this broad views can cover 
without performing detailed analysis 
within all the three perspectives. Thus, this starting point gives a good basis for identifying 
important details in different uncertain and specific challenging areas when using the 
proposed framework for each perspective and still gives an overall view of the strategic 
landscape. Peng proposes two levels of analysis: Business-level and Corporate-level, the 
latter could be most appropriate for big Multi-National Enterprises (MNEs), but without 
excluding a business level analysis as a less important level to analyse for big companies. 
Under the scope of this analysis, Peng, chapter 12, Strategic Alliance and Networks view is 
used to gain an overall insight in the generic strategic environment in Elkem M‟s business 
Institutional 
conditions
Internal resources
and capabilities
Strategy mode(s) Performance
Industry
competition
Figure 1 - Three Perspectives to Performance, Peng 2009 
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area in China. The generic analysis include only parts reviewed as assumed relevant parts of 
Peng‟s tools in the case of Elkem M in China, it is further assumed that strategy analysis is 
a continuous process in the company and in not only the alliance and network perspective. 
The key to leverage competitive advantages and to sustain these advantages in the future 
global marketplace is to use these tools from time to time and in the rapidly changing 
business environment we see today it is increasingly important to do this continuously.  
 10 
2 Overview of Networks and Markets 
Erdos is a Wholly Owned Enterprise (WOE) of Erdos Electrical Power & Metallurgical 
Co., Ltd (Erdos EPM), the latter which Mitsui & Co., Ltd. (Mitsui) owns a 25 % share in, 
Mitsui news release (2006) and Erdos CG well over a 70 % share. Erdos EPM is in an 
EIJV, Inner Mongolia Erdos EJM Manganese Alloy Co., Ltd. (Erdos EJM), where Mitsui 
and JFE Steel Corporation (JFE) own 49 % and Erdos EPM 51%, Mitsui news (2007). 
Erdos EJM produce different alloys for 
steel producers for use in steel 
production to enhance quality and 
different alloy mixes allow production of 
different qualities of steel products. 
Erdos CG have its core business in 
cashmere wool and this is still the 
biggest business area of Erdos Group Co. 
Ltd. 
Recently, Erdos EPM signed a contract 
with China Recycling Energy Corp. 
(CREC) to install heat energy recycling 
systems in 11 of the furnaces at Erdos‟ 
ferro-alloy melting plant in the Erdos Qipanjing Industrial Park in Inner Mongolia. The goal 
is to reduce the consumption of coal in the power plants delivering power to the melting 
plants by 10-12 %, thus saving Erdos EPM as much as EUR 30 million per annum, PR 
Newswire - Asia (April 2009). Further the local government in Erdos, the city, in Inner 
Mongolia have ordered a 2 Giga-Watt solar plant in Inner Mongolia, the contract is with 
The China Energy Conservation Investment Corporation (CECIC), but the U.S. company 
First Solar Inc. is a partner in the project, PR Newswire and FT (October 2009). This will 
be the biggest solar power plant in the world when planned finished in 2019. Orkla and 
Elkem have similar technologies within their business areas today. In other parts of Inner 
Mongolia local governments have big infrastructure projects planned for the coming 
decade. 
Figure 2 - Production Process and Ownership 
Raw 
Material
•Land Rights, Coal Mines, Energy and iron.
•Erdos Business Area companies and partners
Ferro Alloy 
Furnace
•Produces alloy products. Waste is silicafume
•Erdos EJM EIJV
Pre-collector
•Collect silicafume for further processing:
•Erdos-Elkem EIJV
Baghouse 
Filter
•Extract microsilica:
•Erdos-Elkem EIJV
Elkem 
Microsilica®
•Finished microsilica products:
•Elkem WOFE (Distribution and Sales)
   
 
11 
Having mentioned several of direct- and indirect network partners to Elkem M in Erdos city 
in Inner Mongolia gives an overview that the Erdos-Elkem EIJV is only a small part of 
several interconnected companies and government institutions. 
The actual considered Erdos-Elkem EIJV (BM1) was established in 2006 as a 50/50 
ownership company to produce microsilica for the global market. The Chinese market 
seems to be considered of less importance to meet Elkem‟s strategic goals at this point in 
time, but the company spend a lot of resources in China and will continue to do so in the 
future. Erdos-Elkem has an Elkem appointed CEO and the board has three members from 
each of the companies, Erdos EPM has the Chairman of the Board (CoB) and Elkem the 
Vice CoB. Shareholders meetings are arranged when necessary and according to Chinese 
regulations. Elkem M is very satisfied with the cooperation so far in the EIJV, but have 
some concerns when it comes 
to the rapidly growing partner 
and the quality of the 
silicafume that are used to 
produce microsilica. The 
production process of 
microsilica is shown in Figure 
2; hence we see that silicafume 
is a waste product from the 
ferro silicon alloy production. 
Chinese emission control 
regulations require the silicafume to be captured and the waste product is used to produce 
different silicon products. Elkem M is responsible for the transport of the finished 
microsilica from the Erdos plant to shipping hubs and to the customers. 
Microsilica has several applications in many industries and is used to enhance the strength 
and durability of concrete in buildings (mixed with cement), in the oil and gas industry to 
seal wells, as a pellet binder agent, in the window glass industry and several other 
industries. 
Elkem M is a Chinese registered WOFE owned by Elkem and it seems reasonable, in the 
context of this report, to consider Elkem M as an integrated part of Elkem. Further, Erdos, 
as the legal partner in Erdos-Elkem, is seen an integrated part of Erdos EPM. The reasoning 
0
100 000
200 000
300 000
400 000
500 000
600 000
700 000
Europe,M.East, Africa Americas Asia
291 200
95 780
181 877
51 300
2 700
454 623
342 500
98 480
636 500
Mt
Global microsilica production
Jan 2009 production level vs. estimated Dec 2009
Prod Jan 2009
Change
Prod Dec 2009
Figure 3 - Global Production as per Dec 16, 2009, Elkem estimates 
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is simply that managers from Elkem and Erdos EPM makes up the management in Erdos-
Elkem. 
Strong increase in the supply of microsilica from Asia, 90% of the increase is from this 
region, thus creating a strong degree of global competition, Figure 3. As we can see from 
the next, Figure 4, the estimated sales are 
unchanged during the last year and creating 
a strong growth in stocks. 
This market situation creates a strong 
downward tendency in prices in the global 
market and Elkem M has two home market 
competitors, Fesil AS producing almost 
50,000 tons per annum and last Finnfjord 
AS producing about 18,000 tons annually, 
both delivering mainly to the European 
market and with European partners and agents owning parts of their marketing, distribution 
and sales channels. The big increase is in Asia, with Chinese producers forming most of this 
increase in supply. The stock of microsilica is assumed to have increased since late 2008 
according to producers delivering to the European market; however Elkem M seems to have 
avoided this by long term supply agreements to other markets. 
Estimates from the Chinese market, is that about 10% of the total demand is for appliance 
in electronics-, chemicals- and other industries. The main market for silicon materials is 
equally distributed for use in marine structure constructions; high-refractory industry; roads, 
bridges and special cement (e.g. sealing oil-wells)
5
. China seems to have the fastest growing 
markets in these businesses the coming decade as we have seen the rest of the world have 
slowed down on big infrastructure projects. 
  
                                                 
5
 Estimates found on China.Org., December 07, 2009 
570 000
1 100 000
850 000 850 000
0
200 000
400 000
600 000
800 000
1 000 000
1 200 000
Jan '09 Dec. '09
Metric tons
Estimated  Prod
Estimated Sales
Sales figures to be consider as level of indication.
Estimated global microsilica production vs sale
Figure 4 - Global Production vs. Sales Dec, 2009 Elkem estimates 
   
 
13 
3 Framework 
Chinese companies are well experienced to operate in an ever changing business 
environment with fierce competition and will act accordingly in an effort to gain 
competitive advantage. This has been a reality since the market liberalisation in the PRC 
was introduced more than 30 years ago under Deng Xiaoping‟s supervision. After the 
PRC‟s WTO entry in 2001 there has been increased rate of development and changes of the 
Chinese institutions to further support the goal to develop a social market economy, see e.g. 
Bown (2007), Peerenboom (2007) and Wilkin (2004). 
Peng‟s (2009) three generic views to international strategy in Figure 1 is, in brief, used as a 
tool to assess institutions which consist of the regulatory, normative and cognitive pillars. 
Applicable tools are first Porters Diamond to determine the impact of regulatory and formal 
government institutions which includes policies, regulations and laws in the domestic 
market, but also the target country. The cultural and ethical aspects can be evaluated with 
tools from e.g. Hofstede (2001). Porter‟s 5 Forces model, the three generic entry strategies, 
SWOT analysis (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats) in his industry based 
view to strategy. Resource based view include the SWOT tool, Value Chain analysis and 
the VRIO framework (Value, Rarity, Imitable and Organisation). 
This analysis starts with a discussion of particular areas considered of importance in 
Elkem‟s and Elkem M‟s process when deciding a future strategy mode in China, either in a 
continued partnership with Erdos, change to other EIJV partners, SSE mode or WOFE 
mode. The actual analysis is conducted in a PESTEL analysis framework, which include all 
of Peng‟s proposed perspectives to analyse the Political-, Economic-, Sociological-, 
Technological-, Environmental- and Legal Environments relevant to Elkem and Elkem M 
and their operations in China. The analysis considers investments in the value chain, 
ranging the production line from raw material to microsilica, although Elkem and Elkem M 
today solely are involved from the silicafume stage of the value chain. Distribution and 
sales are not considered in this report as this part of the value chain is 100 % owned and 
controlled by Elkem M, though the IPR discussions have implications for the downstream 
value chain. 
The questions discussed in the report are Elkem‟s political relations on central-, regional- 
and local levels, legal considerations regards to market agreements and IPR protection, 
which parent dissimilarities that might be most important to focus on in EIJV modes, which 
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modes give better opportunities regards to the impact Elkem M can have on the silicafume, 
thus enabling production of high quality Microsilica in China, cultural differences that have 
been identified in interviews as challenging to Elkem M and last the sociological 
environment China provides as to offer a competent work force in all levels of the 
organisation in all the four modes outlined in chapter 1.1. 
Hofstede (2001) and Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (1997) both provide detailed 
insight into the cultural and ethical differences between a major part of countries. The two 
give very important, but on the other hand maybe complex approaches to cultural 
differences and how to manage with them. Hofstede focused on IBM alone giving a 
business related approach to culture and Trompenaars including cultural aspects outside a 
pure business environment, which give these two directions complementary tools to 
consider culture and cultural differences and their impact on cross culture business. This 
report has based the discussions on empirical studies like Hitt et al. (2004), comparing on 
how much Russian vs. Chinese business managers focus on different partner capabilities 
i.e.: Technological-, managerial-, complementary- and unique partner capabilities along 
with intangible assets and prior alliance experience. It shows that in a Russian business 
environment the lack of institutional support compared to the extent we find in China, it 
seems to be a lot more predictive institutional environment in China, thus informal 
institutions still plays a vital role. They find support that prior alliance experience is of great 
importance to Chinese managers, thus firms are more likely to appear trustworthy if they 
form a long-term and trusting relationship focusing on building social capital. 
Elkem is strong on this area due to the 33-35 % global market share. A consideration of the 
industry growth opportunities, entry barriers, power of suppliers and buyers, threats of 
substitutes and possible conglomeration. However, based on the fact that Elkem M seems to 
face an increased competition from Chinese companies (new entrants), further the need to 
control the quality of the silicafume delivered to the current EIJV and the increased price 
competition due to higher production than demand on the world market, some 
considerations are made later on. However, fluctuations in the world market price will 
always be there from time to time and a long term strategy should include this fact. One 
new force proposed in Porter‟s diamond, complementors (Peng 2009, p. 48), is considered 
in the PESTEL framework used for the analysis, to consider safeguarding considerations 
Elkem M and Elkem might gain positive outcomes from in a new phase in the Erdos-Elkem 
relationship and the China investments. 
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Recent events has occurred both related to political, judicial and market developments, e.g. 
the negotiations on top political level between China and Norway to pave the road for a 
trade agreement between the two countries and the increase in stock of microsilica due to 
the over-supply situation. 
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4 Preparatory Discussions and Research 
In all aspects of business in global and foreign markets there will be political, legal and 
financial risks involved in any project a company and investment a company engage in. 
Many companies have gained strong competences on how to work in China, but still many 
Western companies have issues that may affect them on specific strategic and tactical 
challenges. Many of these challenges are related to the formal institutional framework, but 
maybe more common is the informal institutions. 
Elkem M has further identified that IPR might be a problem area for them, however 
research suggest that this is a marginal challenge in the metal products business. The size 
dissimilarity between Elkem M and Erdos EPM has also been addressed as a concern to 
Elkem M and both these last two issues are introduced in this chapter. Further some 
empirical studies are introduced and discussed and the influence of knowledge transfer 
given some considerations. 
4.1 Formal Institutions 
Some formal institutions that have an impact Elkem M‟s operations in China are the 
political, administrative and judicial institutions not only in China, but also in Norway. In 
China all these institutions have to be considered both on a central, regional and local level, 
where the latter might be several local-level authorities if Elkem invest in melting plants or 
silicafume treatment plants in several regions of China depending on the strategic mode. 
The administrative system refers to a series of regulations and practices in regard to the 
composition, system, power and activities of the state administrative organs. The central 
administrative organ is the State Council of the People's Republic of China and is as such 
the highest administrative organ of the state. 
There seems to be a strong consensus among researchers that good relations to political and 
administrative institutions in the environment in which they operate is of great importance. 
From a strategy viewpoint this includes concepts as culture and ethics. 
As important are the considerations a company will have to make regards to the industry it 
operates in and the resources and capabilities available to a company.  
Research and previous experience seems to show that Western companies entering 
emerging markets need to emphasize on specific issues compared to entering other markets, 
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suggesting that the nature of an emerging economy is very different from that of other 
markets. 
Norway and China have recently started to build top level political relations that might 
decrease the risks and increase opportunities for Elkem and Elkem M in China. However, as 
the guanxi connection from Elkem or Elkem M managers to key officials should not be 
underestimated as an important success factor in the Chinese business environment the long 
term effects of these relations will depend on how changing governments in the two 
countries manage to uphold these relationships. 
Nevertheless, it might be of great importance to Elkem and Elkem M to build their own 
networks to the Chinese political and administrative institutions from central to local level 
depending on where future investments in China will be made, but still seek political 
support from the Norwegian government when needed regardless of what future strategy 
mode the companies chose in China.. Elkem and Elkem M‟s own networks should be made 
on several levels within the organisation and governance structure, as proposed by Zhu, 
since people change positions in the formal institutions. This will increase the possibility of 
keeping „high quality‟ guanxi networks on a long term basis. Trust building is the key term 
in this picture. As Zhu conclude, participation in networks that lobby for an industry is most 
likely more effective to influence policies, than acting as a single company, unless the top 
management can build very strong relations to key political and administrative actors. The 
proposal is to use top level management in Elkem M as participants in any meeting Erdos 
have with administration and politicians both on central-, regional- and local level. In other 
words, use the close relations to Erdos to gain competences in how to build personal 
relations to important politicians, bureaucrats and officials. 
China is increasing in professionals on high technical level skilled employees and if the 
Chinese work-force can offer highly qualified technicians and business managers there is 
always the opportunity to educate them. Looking closer on the Kodak case (see chapter 4.8) 
shows that this kind of approach can be very successful and including fully shared R & D 
information.  
There has been a revolution in the Chinese judicial system the last 15 years, e.g. Dong 
(2008), and Chow (2003). It seems to be equal in efficiency compared to any judicial 
system in the Western world and the development continues rapidly. Continuous efforts are 
made to improve the judicial system and reduce the amount of legal decision points by 
distributing judicial power to bureaucratic entities, but China is a huge nation and it will 
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probably always be a great challenge for policy-makers, bureaucrats and judicial 
employees. 
Chinese companies are winning increasingly more cases on IPR in foreign countries. 
According to OECD officials, OECD (2009), the quality of the patents Chinese companies 
get approved abroad is of very high standard and improving, and they are doing what is 
required according to national and international laws to protect it. This should be good news 
for Western companies investing in China, showing that Chinese companies strongly rely 
on IPR law, and indicates a strong degree of respect for the concept of IP rights. 
The Chinese judicial system has undergone some big structural changes the last decades, 
and much indicates that the legal system and political system grow increasingly 
independent of each other. 
4.2 Informal Institutions – Confucianism and Communism 
Many Westerners claim that China is westernising due to what they see on the surface in 
cities like Beijing and Shanghai, Chee and West (2007). Considering the cultural onion 
outlined by Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (1997), it is most likely that what we see on 
the surface, (i.e. explicit features like clothes and artefacts), is not necessarily what the 
underlying norms, values and basic assumptions are, (i.e. implicit strong culture based 
values). Some researchers and experienced business people tend to group Chinese people in 
three age groups: >25 which is less dependent on personal relationships to make trust 
relations with Western business partners than the 25-55 age group and  >55 age group 
which still to a great extent rely on personal relations when involved in a business context. 
How these different age groups behave in a business context will vary from region to region 
and the ages proposed here are by no means absolute whether when operating in urban or 
rural areas of China. 
In Norway the culture is far more future-oriented and the perception of time is sequential to 
a strong degree. Planning plays a stronger role in a future-oriented culture as compared to a 
past-oriented culture. This does not mean that Norwegian culture do not emphasise its 
cultural heritage, but rather that the past does not have the same implications on how the 
perception of time influence the way of conducting business in a future-oriented culture. 
This aspect of doing business in China is reported as a problem for numerous Western 
managers and is by many considered a major obstacle for efficiency. In chapter 4.2.4 the 
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concept of how perceived time is related to how Western companies can learn to become 
more flexible and adaptable, using the Western notion of the term. 
Elkem M asks to consider is how to implement a Western Strategy Mind-set in China. 
Today, and in the near future, any attempt to do so will most likely fail due to the cultural 
differences discussed in chapter 4.2. These issues may be best addressed by giving 
expatriate managers cultural training to get a better understanding on how they can adapt to 
the Chinese way of doing business. This report do not find any evidence that the Chinese 
business culture anytime soon will change to a Western-like business culture. Chinese 
people are very proud of their history and heritage, thus willing to change and learn how to 
do business, but this will as all evidence and research suggest be based on Chinese values. 
This leads to the question on how to utilize Chinese flexibility and adaptability in Elkem 
and Elkem M. An understanding of the differences in perception of time, chapter 4.2.4, 
gives a brief introduction to why Chinese business managers seems to be both long term 
oriented and yet some time very short term oriented. This is probably also related to the 
harsh competition in the Chinese domestic market and it might be a good conclusion for 
Elkem and Elkem M to enter the Chinese domestic market to learn how to compete in a 
strong competitive environment and implement the lessons learnt in the global market. 
Kodak and I.M. Skaugen are some examples of successful partnerships in Sino-Foreign 
EIJVs, see chapter 4.  
The key to do good in business in China is nevertheless to have a good understanding of 
Chinese culture with the basic Confucian values and ethics, and of course also be aware of 
the impact the Communist era had on the Chinese culture. For the five basic hierarchical 
relationships defined by Confucius, see e.g. Seligman (1999). 
Trust and reputation are concepts that are far more important in Chinese business culture as 
compared to Norway and other Western business cultures, both in personal- and firm level 
perspectives. Despite the Chinese saying: “The Marketplace is a Battlefield!” does not 
imply that Chinese business people are dishonest. 
4.2.1 Relationships 
The impact of the Confucian and Communist heritage is important to be aware of for 
Western managers. If the proper respect for the deeply rooted hierarchical concept is 
disregarded in interaction with Chinese people, one will most probably not be respected. 
Show respect to earn respect. Similar to the Western notion of respect, but in Chinese 
culture relationships have deeper roots than the relationships in the Western world. The 
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main issue is that everyone who works in China should absolutely learn the concept of give, 
receive, save, lose and take face and try to understand the concepts and act accordingly in 
all relational contexts. 
4.2.2 The Value of Guanxi 关系 
The notion of guanxi, guan/„door‟ and xi an old word for „hierarchy‟ can maybe best be 
explained as a „door into the hierarchy‟ where the latter is related to a person to person 
relation. Guanxi is in its basics the concept of giving opportunities to individuals ranked 
low in the Confucian hierarchy. It is a higher ranked person‟s „duty‟ to aid lower ranked 
persons in his guanxi network, first family and than the more external network. 
From Crow (1937) we find the following quote: “No one in China is too lowly to treasure 
and guard his „face‟, that is his dignity and self respect. And no foreign resident has ever 
accomplished anything in dealing with Chinese if he failed to take this factor into account. 
Those who know how to utilize it have found life pleasant and sometimes prosperous.” 
Guthrie (1998), have asked 81 firms in Shanghai on how much they rely on guanxi and he 
claim he can see a change in urban areas where the importance of guanxi is declining, but it 
will even today be a great mistake to disregard it completely in a business context. And 
guanxi networks are still very important today because of the very important trust element 
included in guanxi. 
Assuming Elkem and Elkem M are well acquainted with the value of guanxi in a business 
context this report will leave the importance of the factors included in the concept and 
rather mention a few examples from the past on how important and crucial for success the 
concept can be in the Chinese business environment today. One thing that maybe is the 
most important part if a company is going into the Chinese domestic market is to 
understand that persistence and understanding the culture are maybe the two most important 
factors to succeed within China. For extended information on the concept in detail see e.g. 
Fahr et al. (1998), Dickinson (2008), Xin and Pearce (1996), Park and Luo (2001), Alston 
(1989) and more. A key success factor seems to be the right connections in the right places, 
implying top management need to form extensive personal relations with a range of public 
officials and business people to succeed, regardless of which strategic mode is chosen. 
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4.2.3 Yin & Yang 阴阳 - Harmony 
The Confucian notion of harmony might seem to be a hinder for efficient communication to 
Westerners. In Western companies it is more common to address challenges without, to 
some extent, fear of stepping on somebody‟s toes. In Chinese culture it is common to avoid 
confrontation to keep peace and harmony, let a conflict ride off by itself so to speak, Chee 
and West (2007). This is the absolute natural manner to react if a potential conflict occurs 
so to avoid for another human to lose face, or lose one‟s own face. Harmony is also closely 
attached to social networks. The total balance of harmony is very important, and if one 
individual is upsetting another individual it can destabilise the entire network of 
connections the two persons are part of. This concept is probably the oldest concept rooted 
in Chinese culture and the notion of Yin and Yang is known to exist in Chinese culture for 
almost 4,000 years. It is not likely that these concepts will play a less role in the Chinese 
society anytime in the near future. These concepts are values and beliefs the Chinese 
population are proud of and it is not likely that those deeply rooted traditions will change to 
fit a Western mind-set. 
4.2.4 Perception of Time – Norway vs. China 
Time is perceived as sequential in most Western countries (things done in sequence, one 
thing at the time) as opposed to China where time is perceived as synchronically (many 
things can take place simultaneously), Trompenaars and Hampden Turner (1997). Time is 
flexible and intangible, thus plans are easy to change. However the long term goals and 
strategies are not easily changed in Chinese culture. This double effect is due to the 
combination of the synchronic perception of time and a culture that is past-oriented, the 
latter indicating a strong respect for historical collective experiences. This view is 
confirmed by many researchers and business people used to operate in the Chinese culture, 
see e.g. Freshfields (2003), Lee (2001) and Chen (2003). 
4.3 Intellectual Property Rights in China 
Rob McEwen, CEO of Goldcorp in Canada had a challenge late 1990s with finding 
financial support to find gold in licence areas. The company did not have the resources to 
find the best places in the licenced areas to extract the raw material. It was a combination of 
lack of sufficient technical internal competencies and poor financial condition that 
prevented the company to search for the gold they knew was there. He decided to put key 
company information and intellectual property open on the internet and unveiled the 
 22 
Goldcorp Challenge early 2000. He found almost 1,500 scientists willing to spend their 
spare-time to assess the geological data (IP of Goldcorp) and file suggestions for the best 
spots to set up search operations. This kind of sharing IP was unheard of in the gold 
industry a decade ago. As Dr. James M. Franklin, former chief geoscientist for the 
Geological Survey of Canada, put it in 2002: “Confidentiality and secrecy about reserves 
and exploration have been its watchwords. This was a totally unconventional thing to do.”, 
Financial Times (2002). No company wanted to share their geological information with any 
competitors, and even less put it out on the internet for everyone to see. The company have 
increased its value by several 1,000% since then and is today strategic owners of several 
gold mining companies, amongst them US Gold.  
If this is possible in America, we can assume for a fact that it will be safer in China. The 
Laws are based on the requirements from WTO but even though China have received a lot 
of criticism for not implementing measures to stop counterfeiting we have to see at the 
facts; counterfeiting is far more usual in the Western world than it is in China, WTO (2009). 
It is the sheer size of the market that creates the focus on counterfeiting in China, not how 
large percentage of the total production or percentage as compared to the population. The 
new IPR legislation and regulatory framework were passed in March 2003 by the State 
Council and has been used in several cases to this date. 
To fully comprehend how the Chinese legal system works, it is also important to understand 
that it has developed from a cultural heritage very different from the cultural heritages of 
Western countries legal systems. A legal system must be accessed within its historical and 
cultural context, Chen (2008). There are vast sources on Chinese laws and how they have 
developed through the 20th century, until the resent almost „revolutionary‟ changes. The 
structure is implemented after Western model, a process that started late 19
th
 century and of 
course interrupted by about 26 years of Maoism. It should be mentioned that there are 
considerable differences between the „European‟ judicial structure and the Common Wealth 
judicial structure, the Chinese system has features from both systems. 
Since 1995, when China first implemented laws on IPR the number of law suits has 
increased dramatically. Most companies that end in court for decisions on property rights 
are Chinese vs. Chinese companies. Only a few foreign companies has been directly 
involved in some of these cases in the Chinese judicial system. There are several examples 
of Western companies awarded in courts in Mainland China, but usually with a lot less 
damage awarded than the original claim. 
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In 2004/2005 10 provinces signed agreements to enforce IPR protection in China, including 
Inner Mongolia. LV, Gucci, Burberry, Prada and Chanel are amongst Western companies 
that have won cases on IPR infringement in China, thus with less damage awarded than the 
original claims. And all evidence found show that both local and central government take 
this issue very serious. 
IPR receives a lot of attention by the Chinese government and there is no evidence that 
counterfeiting is more common in China than in any other country in the world compared to 
the population and market size. The vast majority of IPR infringement cases that end in the 
court system are Chinese vs. Chinese companies. China is enforcing IPR laws on an 
administrative level by the Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and 
Quarantine. Provided that the offended party file a complaint along with evidence of 
infringement of IPR to the proper agencies it is usually easy to get a decision to stop 
counterfeiting. 
One of the most interesting aspects to gather knowledge about for Western companies in 
China is how the legal institutions are set up, sources of law and law-making, administrative 
law, law on business entities, intellectual property law, foreign trade law, investment law 
and, maybe the most important part, the simplified Alternative Dispute Resolution system 
(ADR). This is designed to encourage the informal cultural institutions mentioned in the 
former chapter (Guanxi and harmony) as an integrated part of the judicial system. This part 
of the judicial system makes local institutional conditions more likely to have most impact 
for mitigating legal risk and business opportunities that arise from local judicial conditions. 
4.4 Quantitative Research 
With the previous chapters in mind, it is appropriate to argue why this particular report is 
broadening the TCE approach and then focus on the identified areas of interest for Elkem‟s 
future investment strategies in China. Consider research on knowledge transfer, manning 
policies, social responsibility etc. when assessing the strategic modes that include equity 
investments. These and more issues are discussed further as the proposed areas of focus are 
discussed. 
Greenaway et al. (2007) studied what kind of strategic modes that gives most returns on 
asset investments, sales and labour productivity. They studied well over 20,000 Chinese 
companies in China and their profit margins from 2000 to 2005 whereof almost half of 
them where EIJVs, other equity modes or WOFEs. They found that a foreign ownership 
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share between 47-64 % gives the optimal return for Foreign Direct Investments (FDIs), i.e. 
the corporate performance increase up to this level and decrease as foreign ownership 
exceed this level of participation. Greenaway et al. (2007) suggest that: “…without 
sufficient participation by private agents, foreign investors are unable to perform optimally, 
as they might not have sufficient knowledge of the Chinese market and legal environment, 
as well as the necessary political connections with local governments.” With several EIJVs 
in different regions of China it seems to be consensus that risk will decrease compared to 
investing with one partner. However, as Erdos is investing in other parts of China it might 
lead to better performance for Elkem and Elkem M to increase the obligations in the 
partnership with Erdos when considering the cultural aspects of a continued partnership. 
Not ignoring the fact that long term partnerships seems to be rewarded in the Chinese 
business environment and that the partner dissimilarities between Erdos and Elkem seem to 
be more of a pro, than a con when considering the performance perspective. If Elkem M 
continue to co-operate with Erdos it would most probably be easier to increase the guanxi 
networks and relationships necessary to ensure a long term high performance in China.  
Buckley et al. (2006), who investigated the electronics industry from 1995 to 2001, 
conclude amongst other that: “…foreign capital participation in China‟s industries, and 
sub-sectors, with low levels of exports is likely to be especially beneficial for productivity 
growth in China, and should be encouraged. A caveat here is that the industry concerned 
should be one in which export potential exists.” Basically the same conclusions are made 
by Li (2005), she found a positive relation to performance and a >50 % foreign ownership 
indicating that foreign owners contribute more to EIJV productivity and transfer of 
knowledge if the foreign parent have a majority interest. However, it is important for a 
foreign owner to support a structure where knowledge transfer becomes bi-directional in 
order to combine strategic advantages in collaboration with their Chinese partner. The 
findings of Greenaway (2007), Buckley et al. (2006) and Li (2005) strongly suggest, as 
previous noted, that EIJVs is more likely to succeed in China than a WOFE, or a 100 % 
Chinese owned enterprise. These studies shows something interesting that is distinct for 
FDIs in China as compared to FDIs in other countries including both industrialised, 
developing and emerging economies. It seems that EIJV companies give considerably more 
net profit on average than any other mode in China, while in other markets WOFEs perform 
better, thus WOFEs in general have significantly higher financial risk. 
Introducing the Donane-Wahaha in chapter 4.8 is for the specific reason to compare as to 
how success rate with French EIJV owners are as compared to Chinese EIJV owners. 
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Doz (1998) finds that French/Chinese EIJVs have a lower success rate than 
Scandinavian/Chinese owners.  The management structure seems to be of greater 
importance and may have significant negative impact on a WOFE performance if an 
unsuitable governance structure is implemented and also the mix of cultural differences. 
4.5 Partner Dissimilarities 
Parent size is often used as a control variable in EIJV studies, e.g., Olk (1997) and Lyles 
and Salk (1996). However, the literature findings dealing with differences in parent size are 
inconsistent. Park and Ungson (1997) found no significant relationship between size 
differential and JV dissolution. Some findings suggest that dissimilarity in size enables 
parent organizations to enjoy each other's unique characteristics and consequently leverage 
competitive advantages within an alliance, e.g. an EIJV. The larger parent usually has 
power, accessibility to markets, personnel, capital, and mass production capability. The 
smaller parent often has flexibility and quick response ability, is innovative and ready to 
take risks, and uses advanced technology, Doz (1998). However, contradictory evidence 
can be found in the literature, but one market seems to stand out as very different from other 
markets, the Chinese. In general we 
see smaller firms as entrepreneurial, 
flexible and usually with an informal 
organisational structure, whilst larger 
firms have attributes like 
bureaucracy, complex and slow 
decision-making. This is not at all 
always true today, as we have seen 
many companies has been able to turn around in a matter of months and even big firms with 
informal organizational cultures.  
In the Erdos-Elkem case these size considerations seem somewhat inept. Erdos and Elkem 
present these figures of employees as per December 31, 2009: Erdos Group: 24,000, Orkla: 
30,000, Erdos M: 7,000 and Elkem: 2,900. If Erdos M continue to grow fast and Elkem M 
want to keep a >30% global market share on the global market, it will be a challenge to 
apprehend how Elkem can keep the strategic position outside an EIJV, either with Erdos or 
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 * Exchange rates: NOK/EUR = 8.00, RMB/EUR = 11.00. ** Estimated  revenues. 
Figure 5 - Employees and Revenue Dissimilarities
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other partners in China, when the production of microsilica have increased at such a 
tremendous speed the last year. 
Considering size dissimilarities by turnover we can see that by far is larger than Erdos CG. 
Similar, the revenues for Elkem exceeds Erdos EPM by far in terms of Euro. Only when 
counting by number of employees is Erdos EPM bigger than Elkem. 
Looking at the considerations on formal and informal institutions earlier in this chapter it 
seems more likely that the parent size dissimilarity will be a pro, rather than a con if Elkem 
develops the current BM with Erdos. The size difference and other dissimilarities may be 
used to benefit in terms of strategic position. It seems hard for any competitor to imitate the 
size of Erdos EPM‟s production facilities in Erdos Qipanjing Industrial Park in Inner 
Mongolia and Elkem M‟s market-share and technology. It seems to be a perfect alliance to 
extend the global market with new innovative silicon products, build a new common brand 
with Erdos in the Chinese and Asian markets or simply protect the strategic position Elkem 
M has today. 
Second, if the share in an EIJV, or other kind of shared equity FDI, is between 47-64 % it 
seems to be the best option for any investment in China, thus suggesting that any other 
distribution of shares in FDI in China decreases the performance in a company. This gives 
strong indications that WOFE is not only bringing increased risk as a result of the well 
accepted strategic implications that a 100 % ownership in general involves more risk thus 
higher performance if successful, but this mode also seem to increase risk in the Chinese 
market. This effect may be connected to other factors relevant for investments in China, e.g. 
cultural differences that is hard for Western companies to learn unless they have a stable 
Chinese network to rely on. It may also be because proper connections to relevant political 
and administrative units are harder to get in place without a Chinese agent. Using agents is 
a feasible solution; however it would be assumable that the risk of opportunism increase 
slightly with an agent agreement to take care of. 
4.6 Knowledge Transfer and Performance  
Gooderham and Ulset (2001) outlined an integrated knowledge transfer model which gives 
good reasoning to Elkem and Elkem M‟s challenges in the different modes. Lipana et al. 
(2007) suggest an added element to this framework based on applied use of the knowledge 
transfer model in the INCAT-AFAI EIJV case, Figure 6. This joint venture failed after a 
successful long-term market agreement between the two companies were converted to a 
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signed agreement to form a 50/50 EIJV assigned to build a specific range of fast ferries in 
China. The contract was based on trust only and had a mere three sentences that concluded 
the agreement. Lipana et al. found that the degree of competition between INCAT and 
AFAI was a key element that gave the outcome of the EIJV. INCAT, a Tasmanian based 
company, wanted market-shares in the Chinese market and were supposed to exchange 
technology to its Chinese partner in return. It turned out that INCAT were not as willing 
and able to share technology with AFAI 
as the latter partner anticipated and the 
venture failed, however two ships were 
delivered outside China after several 
years of negotiations between the 
partners. The net financial return was 
positive for both partners in the end. 
To be successful in a foreign market, a 
company need to possess advanced 
technological and marketing 
competencies, but also organizational 
capabilities that enable them to utilize internal resources in an effective manner to ensure 
sustainable growth and profitability, Gooderham and Nordhaug (2003). These 
organizational capabilities are very likely knowledge-based and unique to the company. 
These are most certainly capabilities possessed by Elkem, after all their global market-share 
on the microsilica market is close to 35%. The focus should be on how Elkem can use the 
opportunities that arise from a partnership with the biggest ferro-silicon producer in the 
world. It seems more likely that a close alliance will perform better than an MA in this case. 
The key is to share knowledge and get knowledge on Chinese business in the process. The 
question in this perspective must be to what degree it is achievable for Elkem M to keep 
their market-share if they reduce the control an EIJV can facilitate when it comes to 
knowledge transfer and in particular regards to how able Elkem M is to control the quality 
of the silicafume delivered by Erdos. If Elkem invest in an SSE-, or WOFE strategic mode 
it seems more likely that the HRM policies will increase in importance and drain more 
internal resources from Elkem in the initial phase of a start-up. In the mean time Erdos 
might gain market shares in the Chinese market, where most likely the strongest growth of 
infrastructure project will be the next decade. Other parts of both Far-East and Central Asia 
will most likely continue to grow maybe more than other markets seen in a 10 year 
Figure 6 - Knowledge Transfer, Lipana et al. 2007 
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perspective, this may as well create a shift in the market-shares if Elkem chose an MA with 
Erdos and invest in other modes. However, an SSE mode might be a key to raise the 
performance potential, hence keeping the close relationship to Erdos and other alliance 
partners and official institutions in China. 
Doz and Hamel (1998) argues that strategic partnership have become central to competitive 
advantage in the fast-changing global markets. Skills and essential resources are usually 
found outside a firm‟s internal border and often outside the firm‟s direct controllable 
network. Looking at the Kodak-FUDA case in chapter 4.8 shows that Kodak went outside 
what was, at the time, perceived as possible by most experts, Gooderham and Nordhaug 
(2003) and they formed a centre of excellence in China in the EIJV with a State Owned 
Enterprise (SOE) FUDA. Gooderham and Nordhaug further present a framework of four 
levels of transfer capabilities of tacit knowledge
7
. The firm‟s motivation to move from level 
I to IV is dependent on the organizational structure, strategy and objectives for the foreign 
operations. 
Level I, where a foreign company, marketing a fairly standardised product range on the 
global market, might want to transfer only knowledge on how to operate factories used for 
production purposes, e.g. Elkem M use Erdos as a low price producer to serve the global 
market. And level IV, where the goal is to be a local leader in the foreign country, thus wish 
to transfer substantial knowledge ranging from R&D-, advertising- and marketing 
competencies. The full range of these knowledge transfer levels seems feasible for Elkem to 
accomplish in the three equity BMs, but within the context of Erdos-Elkem or SSE might be 
the modes that will create most pay-offs in the trust building perspective. 
The degree of knowledge transfer will in any of the equity modes are of importance to 
Elkem when considering the best performance alternative due to the degree of internal 
HRM practises the firm can implement into the investment. 
4.7 Criticism of the TCE Approach  
TCE is often disputed and criticised for its ability to mirror a complete set of strategic and 
tactical options for a company to base its decisions upon in a network of interconnected 
transactions. Zhu has discussed political- and legal risks with a TCE view and how it plays 
a role in Elkem M‟s cooperation with Erdos in detail in her report, however it seems to be 
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other determinants not discussed by her that can provide supplementary information in this 
specific case, see chapter 1.2. Without disregarding TCE, for the purpose of this report the 
risk is discussed as a part of the performance variable in an interconnected network 
environment and not analysed as in transactions between two parties. Variables like cultural 
distance and learning/knowledge transfer are important determinants for the performance in 
not exclusively the current EIJV, but also in the other modes considered in this report. This 
chapter discuss information related to elements identified as important to Elkem M in China 
and assess gathered data from Elkem and other sources to prepare the analysis in chapter 5. 
The degree of trust and reputation is in many cases particular important in China and will be 
a major success factor in many aspects of collaboration. However, the younger part of the 
Chinese population is more likely to accept the Western style of doing business, than the 
older part of the population, Chee and West (2007), and it is probably a lot more likely that 
Chinese companies know a lot more about Western business culture than the other way 
around. 
Henisz and Zelner (2004) states that hazards present in transactions between the 
government/administration and a private party differ from those between two private 
parties. In the former case, the investor need to incorporate considering the risks connected 
to the broader polity the government have to rely on to gain support before making choices 
about investments and investments structures, China seem to give special implications 
though, where it seems both a general lobby approach as part of a larger pressure group 
might be equal in importance as the personal relations to people in the political organs.  
Regards to opportunism, Standifird and Marshall (2000) argues that trust exists where a 
party will not act opportunistically regardless of external variables, or future interactions.  
Trust requires familiarity, common interests and mutual understanding; these features can 
only be developed through repeated inter-personal interaction. Assurance does not require 
the pre-existence of a relationship, Standifird and Weinstein (2007). However, some level 
of assurance that the partners will act in a specific way is to some extent required.  
There has been considerably criticism of the assumption of opportunism though, see Hill 
(1991), Ghosal and Moran (1996) and Hodgson (2004). Assurance exists where one party 
believes the other party will perceive future exchange between the parties as profitable and 
beneficiary. Furthermore, this report has found evidence that opportunism is far less likely 
to occur from a Chinese partner than from a Western partner due to the tendency in Chinese 
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culture to focus on harmony, relationships and guanxi rather than conflict, thus creating a 
stronger willingness from a Chinese partner to maintain a long-term win-win relationship. 
In any consideration of the TCE research it seems to be consensus that the approach does 
not capture the importance of alliances and more important, it seems almost impossible to 
predict risk as to when political and bureaucratic institutions is about to fail. In China it 
seems less likely for any major institutional unforeseen change to occur than in any other 
market at the present time and the changes seems to evolve in a fairly controlled manner. 
Changes include the TCE‟s ability to predict a future financial crisis. 
Nevertheless the TCE is very useful as an instrument to explain relations in a wider 
perspective and as a tool to analyse a few variables in a transaction between two, or a few, 
parties and bring this understanding into a broader analysis as used in this report. 
4.8 EIJV Success and Failure 
Today, those considerations seem useless when we see how e.g. the automobile industry has 
collaborated around the world in huge networks, often sharing key technology, with small 
specialized partners the last decades. Today there seems to be little problems sharing this 
technology with Chinese car producers, Volkswagen is one of the Western companies that 
have invested heavily in the Chinese market. If we look at a company like Airbus, it is de-
facto collaboration between 100s of inter-connected internationally diversified firms 
cooperating and sharing technology to build aeroplanes all around Europe, . 
Two approaches that have proven successful entering China is Kodak and ship owner I.M. 
Skaugen. 
Kodak went into a partnership with the Chinese company Fuda, an SOE, in 1984 and 
invested in the Xiamen Plant opening in 1989. This was a turnkey EIJV for Kodak aiming 
to turn the SOE into a state of the art facility. Fuda felt for long that the process was too 
slow, as it took 5 years from the agreement was made until the plant became operational. 
The agreement included Fuda getting full access to state of the art technology from Kodak 
and at a point of time when the Chinese laws and market where far more uncertain than it 
seems to be today. After the opening of the renewed plant CEO George Fisher in Kodak 
built personal relations to Zhu Rongji (First Vice Premier 1993-98 and Premier 1998-03) as 
he had grabbed the importance of guanxi connections to further develop Kodak‟s 
investments. Based on this personal relationship it was possible for Kodak to invest in a top 
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R&D facility in China mainland starting operations in 1998. The Xiamen Plant is today a 
R&D Centre of Excellence and the long term strategy has paid off. Kodak and Fuji now 
share about 80% of the Chinese domestic market charging premium of almost 50% above 
their local Chinese competitors. 
Kodak export technology from China to the world market. One of the key success factors 
was the investment and establishment of educational institutions both for workers, 
researchers, designers and managers which enabled this Sino-Japanese company to succeed. 
Ship owner I.M. Skaugen have invested heavily in the ship building industry in China and 
are sharing key technology with their Chinese partners and are rewarded 25-40% reduced 
costs of new built state of the art LPG tankers compared to using shipyards in the Western 
world. In addition they have during the last 10 years build relations to officials by offering 
investment plans related to carbon dioxide transport and storage. According to Morits 
Skaugen
8
, these plans have made it easier to make good relations both to central and local 
governments and administrations. I.M. Skaugen‟s China ventures are giving reasonably 
good returns thanks to support and tax-reduction schemes for their Chinese activities due to 
the companies green profile in China. The last annual figures for 2009 shows that the 
Chinese activities gives a premium return on investment, though a failed investment in an 
unrelated business reduce the total profit to close to zero. 
Two that EIJVs that dissolved are the INCAT-AFAI EIJV, Lipana et al. (2007), this EIJV 
failed despite an equity share sized approximately for an optimal level for maximum 
performance (chapter 4.4). And of course the very recent settled IPR dispute between 
Groupe Danone and Wahaha. 
The actual failure of INCAT-AFAI was probably due to lack of knowledge transfer and the 
level of competition between the parents (convergent markets). Both these challenges could 
have been solved with a proper and detailed written agreement between the partners, see 
chapter 4.6. 
The Groupe Danone (Danone) and Wahaha EIJV in the beverage industry recently failed 
after an IPR dispute. Many stories have come from this recently settled IPR dispute the last 
three years, most seems to be related to important trust elements vanishing at some point 
during the duration of the EIJV. The dispute has been a multi-national story where Danone 
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filed multiple law suits in several countries where Danone-Wahaha was represented. The 
Wahaha and Danone-Wahaha CEO have claimed Danone used malicious means to hurt, not 
only him in person, but also his family who owned shares in the companies. The dispute 
was settled in harmony September 29, 2009 and is according to available information 
January 15, 2010 still waiting for government approval. The conclusion is that Danone sell 
its 51% EIJV shares in Danone-Wahaha to its Chinese partners. 
The Chinese Danone EIJV partner H&J Vanguard (Vanguard) has moreover filed a law suit 
against Danone as Danone have major ownership shares in more than 30 competing 
Chinese beverage producers and brands. Vanguard want to try this ownership structure in 
courts because they claimed Danone could infringe the Security Laws regulating 
competition in China. 
The former discussions give an overview of numerous factors important to consider for 
Elkem M in future ventures in China. In chapter 5 all these factors are used in a PESTEL 
analysis based on Elkem M‟s current position, future challenges and future opportunities in 
China 
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5 Analysis 
This huge and extensive view would be impossible to discuss in full within the scope of this 
report, but Peng is however used as a methodology to gain an overview of the competition 
on the global market of ferroalloy and silicon products and how the Norwegian and Chinese 
competitors approach these markets globally. The choice of tool to analyse and assess the 
questions and problems identified by Elkem M in this report is however the PESTEL 
methodology (Political, Economic, Sociological, Technological, Environmental and Legal). 
This tool is chosen as it is widely accepted and a first rate tool to back up strategic decisions 
when trying to identify specific factors a company need to focus on to address challenges at 
hand, thus this tool adds important strategic guidance for current and future focus areas. 
PESTEL can be used in many contexts and can be used both in a complex or simple 
process. The tool can easily be used in multi disciplinary analysis where several involved 
parties contribute to address specific issues both internal and external and evaluate the 
importance each addressed challenge have on a company. This discussion will address all 
aspects of the four modes this thesis is assessing to attempt to determine which mode that 
might give the best long term performance for Elkem M in China. This tool has been 
developed for decades and is used in various contexts and under various names
9
. This tool 
is designed to facilitate discussions on an ongoing basis on which trends and factors should 
be monitored closely and might best be used in workgroups. It is known to provide good 
feasibility studies in a wide variety of business areas ranging from e.g. marketing planning 
to organisational change 
And last: This is a tool that should always be used in conjunction with e.g. the framework 
proposed by Peng, never as a stand-alone approach and at the least always as a part of a 
SWOT analysis. An example of a PESTEL analysis form is shown on page 35 and each 
PESTEL Environment is analysed by using the SWOT approach. 
The key questions identified as important to Elkem and Elkem M are all related to the 
question: “Continue the cooperation with Erdos, or invest in other strategic modes in the 
future?” 
With this assumption in mind it is most natural to use an Alliance and Networks view as the 
main focus for the framework. The main framework is still as shown in Figure 1 and an 
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Alliance and Networks dimension is used to assess the framework to find that Elkem M is 
using a differentiating strategy to gain competitive advantage (quality throughout the value 
chain). Peng (2009), part 2 and 3, proposes several dimensions in which the framework is 
useful. 
The central question is to consider the four strategic modes listed on page 4 of this report, 
which gives three possible alliance decisions for future investments in China. 
 Strengthen and use the Erdos equity relationship to position Elkem and Elkem M. 
 Reduce commitment with Erdos and convert to contract mode and consider using 
several other equity partners. In nature equal to BM1 and with established EIJV in 
several regions probably decreased risk and performance? 
 Convert to contract mode with Erdos and chose a „no cooperation‟ mode with either 
WOFE or SSE mode. 
The reminder of this chapter use the PESTEL tool to assess the outlined challenges Elkem 
and Elkem M are facing in China. The SWOT approach is used in each of the dimension 
as depicted in the example of a PESTEL analysis form shown in Figure 7. The basis for 
the analysis is the current Erdos-Elkem strategy if nothing else is stated. Where any of the 
other three modes are applicable in the analysis it is specifically specified.  
   
 
35 
PESTEL Analysis Factors Potential Impact Implication and Importance 
 
High, Medium, Low, 
Uncertain 
Time 
Frame 
Type 
Pos/Neg. 
Impact: 
Increase 
to  
Decrease 
Relative 
Importance: 
Critical to 
Unimportant 
Political SWOT 
Government 
policies, -
structure, -
leadership, 
Political trends, 
Stakeholders 
demands etc. 
     
Economic 
SWOT 
Economy trends 
Home/Overseas
, Market cycles, 
Industry factors, 
Production 
levels etc 
     
Sociological 
SWOT 
Image Brand/ 
Company, 
Ethical Issues, 
Demographics, 
Education, 
Management 
style etc. 
     
Technical 
SWOT 
Competing 
products, R&D, 
IPR, Technology 
access etc. 
     
Environment 
SWOT 
Environment 
regulations 
Home/Overseas
, Market values, 
Management 
style, Employee 
motivation, 
Organisational 
culture etc. 
     
Legal SWOT 
Legislation 
Home/Overseas
, Regulatory 
body, -process, 
Industry 
regulations, 
Competitive 
regulations etc. 
     
Figure 7 - PESTEL analysis form, an example 
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5.1 Political Environment 
INTERNAL 
Strengths 
 Elkem can use Erdos as a mean to gain closer relations to political officials. 
 Erdos and Elkem together constitutes a stronger political lobby (internalize). 
 Less effort to read political signals within a BM1 and BM2 scenarios. 
Weaknesses 
 BM3 / BM4 modes decrease performance regards to interpreting political signals. 
 Political connections to central, regional and local governments. 
 Restricted industry: More arduous to get land rights in a BM3 and BM4 mode. 
EXTERNAL 
Opportunities 
 Top political support for investments in-China. 
 Trade agreement China-Norway and close political relations. 
 Lobbying easier with good Chinese business network – pressure group. 
 Relatively good stability in leadership and political direction in China. 
 Political aim with allowing FDI = get a fair share of benefits, win-win perspective. 
 China looking to Norway for constructing a social security system. 
 Legislation made to increase mobility of the Chinese work-force across regions. 
Threats 
 Complex political structure – central vs. regional/local. 
 Erdos‟ personal relations and guanxi networks to different political levels might be 
used as a tactic for opportunistic behaviour within the BM1. 
 Power given from political to administrative system (BM3 and BM4?). 
 Importance of guanxi in China with changing governments in Norway. 
Within the cooperation in Erdos-Elkem it should be standardised procedure in the EIJV for 
Elkem M managers to participate in any official meetings or social context meetings where 
Erdos managers working in Erdos-Elkem is attending. This will both serve as a golden 
opportunity for Elkem M managers to build important personal relations with officials and 
help to gain a deeper understanding of the Chinese political, administrative and regulatory 
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institutions and moreover get a first-hand experience on how Chinese culture works, see 
chapter 4.2. If we consider this aspect under a possible future WOFE or SSE mode this will 
probably be of crucial importance to Elkem and Elkem M‟s performance in China. Similar 
effects can naturally be achieved in a several EIJVs mode, thus decreasing the risks 
according to Zhu‟s transaction cost approach which the performance approach seems to 
confirm will decrease overall Elkem M performance as well. 
One thing that that seems to be certain with Chinese politics is that it is reasonably 
predictable, thus constantly evolving. The Chinese government have not shown any sign at 
all that indicate that they will ever return to a closed economy, all evidence and sources 
used are mostly consistent in claiming that the political institutions want a win-win situation 
and intend to treat both Chinese and foreign companies equally, see e.g. Zhu p. 22 and 28, 
Shi (2008), MOFCOM, Tang et al. (2003) and Gamble (2002). 
Erdos‟ guanxi networks with political actors can be used for opportunistic behaviour, but 
not very likely when considering chapter 4.2 and in particular chapter 4.2.3 in this report. 
Zhu has extensive and good discussions on opportunistic behaviour, while the most likely 
outcome in any EIJV between a Chinese and foreign partner is that the Chinese partner will 
focus more on a win-win scenario if the relations inside the EIJV is considered good and the 
level of trust is high. Research explaining the phenomenon that China seem to have 
decreased risk of opportunistic behaviour than in other markets are discussed closer in 
chapters 4.4 through 4.6.  
The Norwegian political environment seems more instable in many ways than the Chinese 
system, but the size of the system reduce uncertainty as to how cost-effective lobbying can 
be conducted. Nevertheless, there are elections every 4
th
 year that may change the political 
direction in business- and foreign policies, thus also relations to foreign governments. This 
might very likely have a big impact on what is happening on a long term basis in the 
relations between China and Norway and might change the policies in China in certain 
industries. 
An current example to illustrate the instability in Norwegian policies is the tax 
disagreement with Norwegian ship owners which started with the parliament in 2006 
deciding ship owners should be treated according to EU regulations indicating zero tax 
under certain conditions, but the government sent a claim amounting to more than 20 billion 
NOK in deferred tax due to the Parliament decision. The case was in the Supreme Court in 
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Norway January 11 this year and the verdict are soon due to be published. Concurrently to 
this the Norwegian Prime Minister promises tax freedom according to EU regulations for 
ship owners who register their vessels under Norwegian flag and this with an almost 
identical political fractioned government in 2006 and 2010. Several ship owners claim to 
Norwegian and international press they have no trust in these promises from the 
government due to the ever changing policies. These changing „moods‟ in the top political 
arena sends signals that the relations to China might change in the future, but for the time 
being the direction is closer top political relations between the two nations which suggest 
more opportunities and a better predictable political environment for businesses and 
business relations. One significant factor that still is related to increased risk is the extended 
administrative powers used to reduce number of official players involved in the political 
decision making process. 
The first week of February 2010 the Chinese government informed that import restrictions 
on some key U.S. commodities will be implemented. The reason is Barack Obama‟s 
planned meeting with Dalai Lama and because U.S. is selling weapons and weapon systems 
to Taiwan. This is considered by the Chinese government to hurt the good personal relation 
the American President has built with Chinese top politicians. These issues will obviously 
continue to occur from time to time on a top political level, even between Norway and 
China, depending on what relations and which issues are discussed. One thing is the facts of 
any conflict; another issue is how the conflicts are presented to the public in Norway and 
China. The latter is dependent on the informal part of the institutional perspective in Peng‟s 
framework and what people in general want to perceive as the truth based on the cultural 
heritage and values in two different cultures. 
Further discussion on the opportunity that occurs from increased mobility of the Chinese 
work-force is moved to chapter 5.3 due to the nature of the recent policy change. It is a 
political decision, but indicates de facto opportunities for Elkem M in the sociological 
environment section of the analysis. 
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5.2 Economic Environment 
INTERNAL 
Strengths 
 Elkem relatively strong financial position. 
 Credit availability and access to financial instruments for investments. 
Weaknesses 
 Restrictions from parent company, Orkla or Elkem, for investments in general? 
EXTERNAL 
Opportunities 
 China support investments from foreign investors. Some regions give tax reduction. 
 Wages and production costs favourable for export to world market. 
 Erdos might provide Elkem M stronger financial credibility. BM3 similar effect. 
Threats 
 Interest rates / Exchange rates / Inflation? 
 Weaknesses in the Chinese financial sector and possible future e.g. due to the 
challenges on privatisation of SOEs. 
 Strong price competition on microsilica both from Chinese and Norwegian 
competitors due to increased supply. 
 Global stock increase with possible increased future storage costs. 
Even in during the financial crisis it seems obvious that the Chinese economy is strong and 
healthy, though some analytics have expressed some worries. Elkem and Orkla seem to 
have been managing well so far during the downturn in the financial markets. The Chinese 
government have allocated financial support to infrastructure projects in China and these 
economical dispositions have a positive effect on the global economy, DN February 02, 
(2010) and OECD (Feb 2009). 
Strong price competition on microsilica both from Chinese and Norwegian competitors due 
to falling demand is creating some dilemmas for Elkem M. Fesil and Finnfjord are reducing 
prices to reduce the current surplus stocks of microsilica. Elkem M indicates that they may 
have to reduce prices temporarily as much as 18 – 20 % to keep their global market shares. 
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Changing market conditions will occur in the future as well, similar to the current situation 
with over-supply of microsilica that by far exceed the demand leading to lower prices and 
customers accepting lower quality microsilica due to the financial crisis. Long term 
observations of China have shown clear evidence that all these fluctuations in global 
markets and down turns in industries has been of less importance to the growth rate in the 
Chinese economy. It remains strong, though several argue that the growth cannot sustain 
indefinitely in time. Still the Chinese economy have had a relatively stable very high 
growth through many global financial crises the last 30 years and most agree that the 
potential to sustain the current growth, with proper government governance, can continue 
for several decades to come, see e.g. Wilkin (2004), OECD (2009) and World Bank report 
(2009). 
Companies use China either as a strategic disposition to reduce production costs or to both 
reduce costs and enter the Chinese market. Elkem M have not been clear weather the 
company is using China as a low cost strategy, but the interviews with Elkem M strongly 
indicate the latter. China is becoming a huge market for infrastructure projects and in 
particular after the measures China has started to decrease the impact of the global financial 
crisis. It seems like mistake not to enter with full force into the Chinese market with silicon 
products. In cooperation with Erdos this seems as a good opportunity that most probably 
can increase performance in the current strategic mode compared the three other modes, not 
excluding the other modes. At any point of time in the future a combination of the four 
modes analysed here might be a driver for even stronger performance for Elkem M.  
Erdos might provide Elkem M stronger financial muscle in China in a continued or 
expanded partnership with Erdos. 
5.3 Sociological Environment 
INTERNAL 
Strengths 
 Good relation with Erdos. Trust development. 
 High technology competence in the ferroalloy and silicon industries. 
 High management skills and long history in the global industry. 
 Health, safety and social responsibility focused. 
 Employee training programs.  
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Weaknesses 
 Lack of ability to utilize Chinese flexibility and adaptability. 
 Lack of understanding towards Chinese culture and norms?  
EXTERNAL 
Opportunities 
 Implementation of social responsibility programmes to build trust. 
 Invest in education in local communities where Elkem M is represented. 
 Managerial education for local managers. 
 Certification programs for operators and workers. 
 Trust building through public infrastructure, pension funds and health-care plans. 
 Implement Western Strategy Mind-set in Chinese partnerships. 
Threats 
 Age distribution in some regions might be a challenge. 
 Erdos have developed strong competencies in the microsilica industry. 
 Lack of due diligence if searching new partners. 
 Perceived unequal incentive schemes between expatriate and local managers. 
The strengths outlined are all trust builders both towards the formal Chinese institutions and 
maybe outside the immediate network and stakeholders in any of the four modes. Based on 
empirical studies of profit margins and performance in Chinese businesses the assumption 
is that a WOFE mode may make these strengths less important regards to increase the 
performance in Elkem M. It is self-explanatory that investments in public health and 
education will strengthen Elkem M‟s reputation in any local Chinese community, thus 
investments in the big cities most probably will require more focus on traditional marketing 
to build awareness and trust. 
In chapter 4.2.4 the important difference of the notion „perception of time‟ is between the 
Chinese and Western cultures and not to forget the concept of trust. Meland stated, in the 
initial meeting with Elkem M, that it would be useful to Elkem M to be able to adopt the 
Chinese flexibility and adaptability. The later interviews has revealed that Elkem managers 
involved in the board meetings and management of Erdos-Elkem finds it very challenging 
to deal with the quick and unforeseen decision-making by Erdos managers. It is quite 
common that this kind of cultural difference lead to dissolved partnerships between Chinese 
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and Western partners, e.g. Deloitte (2007) and Lipana et al. (2007). The importance of the 
somewhat common misunderstanding that China, as a long term oriented society, are 
perceived to be short term oriented due to quick decision-making common in Chinese firms 
may lead to lack of trust towards the Chinese partner. This particular difference in culture is 
very often reported to be misunderstood by Western managers, e.g. Luo (1997a) and 
Phillips (2001). This shown behaviours from Chinese managers is considered to be 
inconsistent with what Western managers understand is a long term perspective. The 
information from the interviews in Elkem M suggests that a cultural education programme 
for expatriate managers could be of importance if BM1 or BM2 is continued, maybe even 
more important if SSE or WOFE strategy is the future for Elkem M in China. Nevertheless, 
the research used for reference in this report suggests that this knowledge is best acquired 
within an EIJV. 
The Chinese government have opened further to increase mobility of the Chinese work-
force across regions. In any of the four modes this suggests that more parts of China can be 
used in the search process to employ more qualified workers. In a cost perspective this also 
implies that in case access to qualified workers is not there, a centralized training centre is a 
feasible solution to get well trained workers. This will definitely in any of the strategic 
modes be of importance to build trust in multiple regions of China, but local work-force 
should be prioritised due to the local authorities‟ incentives to approve investments that will 
improve the standard of living locally. Zhu have pointed out that central authorities may be 
a source to get approval even if local approval is not given, Zhu p. 27. 
China with its almost 5,000 years of history is not likely to change their way of thinking 
strategy, Chee and West (2007) and Kim and Nam (1998). Efforts to implement a Western 
strategy mind-set in a Chinese partnership would most probably lead to trust issues and the 
possibility of loss of face for Western managers. Since harmony is a strong concept in 
Chinese culture, nothing is beyond repairable in a Chinese business environment if the 
alliances, guanxi connections and networks have endured for some time, see chapter 4.2. 
It seems likely that Erdos is learning fast from the experiences they share with Elkem in 
Erdos-Elkem. The question on how Elkem can learn how to utilize Chinese flexibility and 
adaptability in their business strategies. It might be necessary to change some organisational 
structures, or develop programs where Erdos start educational programmes for Elkem 
managers. However, a better understanding of the Chinese culture from the foreign 
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managers might do the trick within the current governance and organisational structure. 
Leaving the EIJV strategy will with no doubt delay this important learning process. 
Lack of understanding towards the Chinese culture and norms and how to adapt to both the 
long term perspective known to be a cultural feature in China and at the same time react to 
the quick decision making process by Chinese managers in Erdos. 
The single most given advice in regards to legal related issues is due diligence, a process 
that might be time consuming and costly. Wolff (2008) points out several topics that should 
be considered by a proper due-diligence before choosing to enter a co-operation with a 
Chinese partner. Organizational structure of the target company, material contracts, land 
rights and use, main assets, finance, tax, labour and social insurance, IPR and technology 
transfer, productivity liability, environmental issues, foreign exchange control and legal 
proceedings. These topics are also suggested by Deloitte (2007) in the cases where they 
have acted as agents for FIEs in China. And it cannot be stressed enough that how the legal 
environment is in different provinces and local areas vary. In Southern and Western 
provinces the infrastructure is still lacking, and it is more likely to find more obstacles for 
successful investments in those areas. The central government has however several projects 
to build railroads and roads to these difficult to reach areas.  
5.4 Technological Environment 
INTERNAL 
Strengths 
 High end quality microsilica producer. 
 Strong brand name. 
 Strong marketing organisation. 
 Elkem M‟s R & D history of innovation and product development. 
Weaknesses 
 Erdos produce low quality silicafume due to poor technological equipment. 
 MA strategic modes decrease Elkem M‟s control on microsilica quality 
 Administration of multiple Chinese partners in BM2.  
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EXTERNAL 
Opportunities 
 Introduce new technology into the Erdos partnership to get better silicafume quality. 
 Inside opportunity to improve the silicafume quality within the Erdos/Elkem EIJV. 
 Protect high quality microsilica in a BM3 or BM4 strategy. 
Threats 
 Low cost and low quality producers in the global market. 
Elkem M has long traditions of developing new improvement technologies as was done e.g. 
in 1976 in Zambia when silica was used to recover cobalt with an approximate 50 % cut in 
energy consumption, Whyte (2009). The team hired to develop the new technology 
consisted of individuals with talent and personality capable of realize radical improvements 
within a short timeframe and used a back to basic approach to develop radical 
improvements in the production process. 
The willingness to share key technology in a partnership and how to share it with partners 
and within an alliance structure can be a great challenge to decide. Assuming microsilica is 
a relatively standard commodity easy to replicate by competitors it is other factors that seem 
more important to focus on, like the distribution and sales. However, since quality of the 
end product can vary according to the quality of the silicafume, it is a potential for 
improvement and differentiation from competitors. Elkem M have several options on how 
to do this, ranging from MAs, where Elkem M have less control with the quality of the 
finished product, to a WOFE where Elkem M have full quality control. A key to gain access 
to regulated markets in China is to apply to the standards of the National Development and 
Reform Commission (NDRC), Zhu p. 24. Seen in the perspective of the sociological 
environment analysis, chapter 5.3, and the informal institutions chapter 4.2, e.g. chapter 
4.2.2, it seems to be a good idea to include a Chinese partner in an EIJV mode and share 
technology. Further aspects of this conception are discussed in chapters 4.4 and 4.6. 
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5.5 Environmental Environment 
INTERNAL 
Strengths 
 Elkem and Elkem M high focus on emission reduction. 
 Location of production in China of little importance. 
Weaknesses 
 Investments in rural regions gives longer hauls to central shipping hubs 
EXTERNAL 
Opportunities 
 Strict emission control policies 
 Erdos investing in increased environmental friendly production 
 China plan to be in the forefront on carbon dioxide capture and storage 
Threats 
 Land use restrictions. 
 Central and local emission restrictions. 
 Infrastructure; lack of roads or railroad access. 
The Chinese government are enforcing policies in almost all industries in China to keep 
pollution at a minimum, though the increased central investments in infrastructure will 
create more emissions. Nevertheless, China is one of the countries in the world with the 
strongest regulations and emphasis on environmental friendly industry and will welcome 
any foreign investor that can add technology and knowledge that can reduce demand for 
power and emissions to the surrounding environment. Per capita, China must be considered 
very competent on carbon dioxide and NOX emission reductions as compared to Western 
countries. However, the share size of the Chinese population and the amount of industrial 
production is a challenge when attempts are made to keep emissions at an acceptable level. 
Any effort from foreign investors to reduce these negative effects of industrial production 
will surely increase the possibility for high performance of investments in China e.g. 
increased opportunities to gain access to land, resources and investment incentive plans 
similar to the tax incentives given for investments in the autonomous Inner Mongolia . 
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Investments in multiple rural regions give longer hauls of finished microsilica to central 
shipping hubs thus creating more emission (applicable to all modes). 
Strict emission control policies (both economical and social in nature) will create a 
competitive environment which in that Elkem M and Elkem can gain competitive advantage 
by staying best in the league. 
Erdos is also investing in increased environmental friendly production, e.g. with the JV with 
China Recycling Energy Corp., to collect waste heat from production to produce power to 
reduce the need of coal power to the furnaces. This gives clear indications that Erdos is 
interested in developing more efficient technologies, thus gives Elkem M opportunities, 
within the current EIJV, to aid in increasing silicafume quality and propose more 
environmental friendly production technologies to Erdos. 
Norway has a 40 year perspective to introduce zero carbon dioxide emission and few efforts 
seem to be made politically to introduce new technology gradually, it is either a “zero 
emission today” perspective, or a “use the technology we have available today” perspective 
that seems to be the most leading political views in Norway. Last is the new delay of 
investment in a 60 % emission reduction at the gas power plant at Mongstad where the 
politicians want a total emission reduction technology implemented. China has a continuous 
improvement approach. 
5.6 Legal Environment 
INTERNAL 
Strengths 
 Detailed contracts and agreements written in Chinese with Erdos?  
Weaknesses 
 Lack of detailed contractual agreements written in Chinese? 
 Lack of good connections to relevant judicial administrative entities?  
   
 
47 
EXTERNAL 
Opportunities 
 Investments in China subject to approval of the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM). 
 Investment <USD 30 million subject to local considerations, thus MOFCOM might 
take precedence over local decisions 
 IPR protection through MOFCOM. 
 Counterfeiting is less common in China, compared to the size of the markets  
Threats 
 Norwegian vs. Chinese legislation. 
 The Chinese judicial system is huge, complicated and a constantly evolving system. 
Legal statistics is relatively reliable sources and the latest information from China seem to 
show very clear that the main difference today is not that the political and legal system in 
China are behind any Western political and legal system in competence and the efficiency 
of these institutions. See Chen (2007) for statistics on cases tried in the legal system and the 
time spent to solve them within the laws and regulations and Wolff (2007). Comparing 
Chinese and Western figures shows that the Chinese legal system with no doubt is catching 
up with their Western counterparts, if not even shows a lot more efficiency in how many 
cases they process and what percentage of court cases that are not ended within the first 
year. 
The formal legal institutions in China are undergoing a tremendous development to support 
further growth and stability in a huge national environment. Chen (2008), Dong (2008) and 
Chow (2003) all depict a revolution of the judicial system the last 15 years. The formal 
educational level of judges and judicial personnel has increased rapidly, and from late 
1980s the judicial personnel has changed from employees with former military background 
to employees with relevant judicial education and experience. The Supreme People‟s Court 
(SPC) has been given the task by the Central Committee of the Communist Party (CCCP) to 
further strengthen law enforcement and in time the intention is to make the courts fully 
independent of the Communist Party. Local conditions in the courts must however still be 
considered of great importance, as it is perceived as a challenge that local and regional 
courts sometime seem to interpret laws in accordance to local and regional culture and 
history rather than according to decisions made by the Supreme Court. Compared to court 
systems in the Western world, the Chinese seems to follow a similar pattern in the 
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development of the legal institutions. All legal systems are more a result of the culture and 
history of the environment which they operate in, rather than making decisions according to 
the letter of the law. Business cases are by nature often extremely complex and may imply 
difficulties for courts to decide exactly what will be a correct decision according to the laws 
considered. This is similar to what we see in many cases involving big companies in 
Western courts. Because of the share size of the PRC legal system, the task to make the 
Chinese lower and intermediate courts and judicial entities part of, and loyal to, a 
centralized Supreme Court a huge and tremendous challenging task. Comparing China‟s 
cultural diversity to the cultural diversities within Europe, makes it reasonable to assume 
that the chances for local and regional differences on interpretation of laws by the courts in 
different regions of China will differ, thus increases the judicial risk aspect. Zhu p. 36 
discusses this aspect as to how it will affect governance cost for Elkem and Elkem M. 
However, it is very difficult to measure the cost exactly with these local and regional 
differences.  
Using the business and investment perspective, it seems more risk mitigating to diversify 
investments throughout different 
regions of China. The big question 
is: How this will affect 
performance in each of the 
strategic modes within the scope 
of this report is hard to predict 
within the scope of this report. 
Still many Chinese judicial 
experts consider political, 
economic, social and cultural 
settings of great importance on 
how law enforcement is enacted in 
China, if not the most important 
factors. Research on European 
counties law and justice argues likewise with similar arguments. Law and justice cannot be 
understood unless it is seen in light of the historical and cultural setting which in it operates. 
As in the case of the Chinese political system, the National People‟s Congress (NPC) is the 
supreme institution in the Chinese legal-/judicial institutions. The relationship between the 
party and the administrative- and bureaucratic authorities are more or less identical to those 
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of the NPC and the courts. The NPC is the top authority in the legal and judicial system as 
well and the courts have also developed judicial administrative systems similar to the other 
administrative systems to optimize the organization and structure, Chen (2008). Chen 
suggest a slightly different approach to describe the structure of the legal/judicial system in 
China, but in general as it is shown in Figure 8. 
The relevant system for business entities and IPR cases are handled by the People‟s Courts, 
except in cases involving questions on maritime disputes and disputes related to railways. 
To what extent these laws might be applicable to Elkem M‟s operations in China is not 
considered in this report. In the past, the general laws have been emphasized by the higher 
courts, rather than specific laws concerning e.g. EJVs and FDIs. The same trend has been 
observed in cases where market agreements have been used as business model for co 
operations between foreign and Chinese companies. 
One of the main concerns of the legal system in China is de facto that it seems difficult to 
increase the independence between the court system and the administrative- and 
procuratory systems. This is the single area where there is no immediate evidence that the 
Chinese government will put efforts in to change the close connections. In some regions the 
police are part of the procuratorate system. 
Counterfeiting is less common in China, compared to the size of the markets, than what it is 
in Western and other Asian markets, WTO (2010). Most Chinese IPR court cases are 
Chinese vs. Chinese companies and several Western companies have won cases in the legal 
system. 
In a legal perspective the multiple new partners approach, BM2, with a detailed contracts 
and agreements strategy seems most likely to become a strong point to Elkem M both for 
keeping potential conflicts out of the court system and to enable conflicts to be solved in a 
peaceful manner between partners to retain harmony.  
The judicial system in China is a huge, complicated and a constantly evolving system and 
might send some surprises that complicate any efforts to identify the relevant safeguarding 
parameters as to who is the actual judicial entity in power in different regions.  
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6 Summary 
China has a 5,000 year old culture and history which has developed some strong cultural 
specifics that is not easily changeable, though the open door policy, serve as a facilitator for 
major cultural changes in some areas of China. The old heritage from the dynasties, 
Confucian and communism will play a major role in how Chinese businesses act in the 
markets.  All this history is still a major contributor to the informal institutions in China. It 
seems to be observed that younger generations have a stronger tendency to change than the 
older generations, and with the age distribution of increasingly larger elderly population this 
heritage cannot be ignored by Western business managers. The cultural attributes of trust 
relationships, guanxi, harmony and the concept of time should be in any manager‟s mind. 
Zhu analysed two different business models to approach the challenges facing Elkem in its 
EIJV with Erdos. In BM2 the proposal is to sell shares in the Elkem-Erdos JV and convert 
the equity venture to a market agreement. One of her conclusion is to avoid any attempt to 
build too close political and administrative relationships with individual public employees 
both at central and local levels. Individuals can be change their position and new 
individuals appointed as responsible for Elkem‟s particular area of business. This might, in 
many cases, imply different enforcement of policy in a future business environment. Hence, 
it is crucial to build and maintain good relations to both local and provincial and federal 
officials to secure the expected return of any investments in all BMs, including BM3 and 
BM4. The latter is supported by e.g. Chen (2008), Wolff (2008) and Deloitte (2007). It 
might seem that this is not applicable to top level relationship, which seems less vulnerable 
for changed personal conditions as observed in the FUDA-Kodak case. 
Other parameters, identified in this report, are the fear for IPR infringements in the 
ferroalloy industry in China in particular. Documented copyright infringement cases counts 
for a very small portion of the market, assumed to about 1 % of the market‟s total value. 
Western companies, mainly in consumer based business areas, have won cases, but are 
compensated less than they claim for compensation by Chinese courts. Further is the 
interesting observation that the EIJV mode seems to harvest higher return on investments in 
China than the WOFE mode. Foreign ownership shares between 47 and 64% are discovered 
to be optimal, found by Li (2005), Buckley et al. (2006) and Greenaway et al. (2007). 
Doz (1998) found circumstantial evidence that Chinese-Scandinavian EIJVs is probably the 
best equity combination in China. A good match for the cultural dimension differences 
between China and Scandinavian cultures is the only obvious explanation. Last is the 
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assumed size- dissimilarity between Erdos M/Erdos and Elkem M/Elkem. Figure 5 shows a 
fairly equal size in revenues and number of employees in the companies, included in the 
parent companies. There is no apparent proof found that suggest the size difference need 
special considerations by Elkem M, though the situation might change in the future.  
The main objective with this report is to discuss the four strategic modes related to factors 
identified by Elkem M managers. The four tactical modes are: 
1. Continue and develop the current EIJV with Erdos. 
2. Market agreement (MA) with Erdos and invest in other EIJV Melting Plants in other 
regions of China. 
3. MA with Erdos and register Elkem M at the Shanghai Stock Exchange. 
4. MA with Erdos and a Wholly Owned Foreign Enterprise strategic mode in other 
regions in China 
These modes have been analyzed with six identified concerns of Elkem M in mind: 
1. Political relations on central-, regional- and local levels. 
2. Legal considerations regards to market agreements and IPR protection. 
3. Parent dissimilarities that might be important to focus on the EIJV strategic mode. 
4. Control of the quality of the silicafume from the different strategic modes. 
5. Cultural differences Norway vs. China and how they may impact Elkem M. 
6. The sociological environment regards to recruitment and training of qualified workers 
and managers in China  
The size dissimilarity between Erdos M and Elkem M and their parent companies seems to 
be more of a strategic advantage, rather than a challenge. Elkem M has access to 54 
furnaces in one location gives Elkem M opportunities to exploit the relationship between 
the size of Erdos‟ production facilities in Inner Mongolia and Elkem‟s strong global market 
position. This difference can be a measure to leverage market shares in several markets as 
the production in the global market increase. Not to forget the opportunity to gain economy-
of-scale advantages. 
Figure 9 sums up the main findings for BM1 through BM4 in a SWOT table. 
Considering the current tactical mode where the primary focus for Elkem M is the EIJV 
with Erdos we can see that an internal strength is the good relations with Erdos M. A 
weakness with the BM1 configuration is the transaction cost of persuading Erdos M to 
increase the technical quality of the silicafume. The interviews imply that the level of 
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cultural understanding towards the Chinese culture on Elkem management level could be 
better. The expedient to meet this weakness can be a cultural training program for Elkem M 
managers. Moreover, a procedure for bi-directional knowledge transfer may also be used to 
meet this challenge. These two measures might strengthen the possibility for future 
integration of Chinese flexibility into Elkem M‟s operations in China and increase the level 
of implementation of a Western strategy mind-set into Elkem M‟s Chinese operations. The 
latter however, seems to fall through as a risky policy in all modes, but might be 
implemented in a BM3 and BM4 mode with carful considerations of the Chinese cultural 
heritage. The Chinese notion of strategy is several thousand years old and is in any sense as 
good as the Western notion of the term, which in turn might induce the Chinese managers 
to feel less about themselves. This is most probably, in any mode, not a situation Elkem M 
can benefit from in a long term relationship with Chinese employees and with regards to the 
findings on Sino-Scandinavian EIJV‟s performance it seems a better tactical disposition to 
mix the two cultures.  
An evaluation of the alternative business modes in China furnish evidence that it might be 
related to greater performance to stay in a BM1 mode as opposed to a BM4 mode at the 
other end of the scale. The latter seems to carry more risks in a Chinese business 
environment, as it will in any market. In the performance perspective this seems that a 
decrease in performance is equally applicable from BM1 towards BM4. This observation 
contributes to an assumption that each mode needs a different set of measures to be optimal 
and according to Elkem‟s strategy. 
The main challenge in today‟s market seems to be the relatively rapid growth in microsilica 
supply on the global market, not forgetting the financial crisis which in turn creates less 
demand for microsilica in general and in particular high end Microsilica
®
. The question is 
more a matter of which countermeasures should be taken with these changes. Elkem‟s 
history shows examples of many world-class R & D efforts; the Rokana cobalt plant in 
Zambia is one example. Besides, with a strong marketing organisation the opportunities to 
develop new markets in Asia and China should be achievable.  
Regards to the business models researched BM1 seems to need more focus on cooperation 
networks, both internal business areas networks and external towards Erdos. Internal 
networks to achieve optimal performance and a better utilization of new opportunities in 
China for other Elkem and Orkla business-areas. The planned construction of a 2 GW solar  
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Figure 9 - SWOT summary 
 BM1 BM2 BM3 BM4 
Strengths 
 Global market share 
 Premium price 
 Relatively high 
profit margin 
 Guanxi established with Erdos 
 Uncertainty Avoidance and 
Masculinity/Femininity difference 
 Global market share 
 Interpret political signals 
 Uncertainty Avoidance and 
Masculinity/Femininity difference 
 Global market share 
 High quality silicafume 
 Premium price 
 In-house R & D 
 Control silicafume quality 
 Global market share 
 High quality silicafume 
 Premium price 
 In-house R & D 
 Control silicafume quality 
Weaknesses 
 Control silicafume quality  
 Knowledge transfer from Erdos 
 Low quality silicafume from Erdos 
 Cultural understanding and 
knowledge level 
 Control silicafume quality 
 Cultural understanding and 
knowledge 
 Administration of multiple 
partnerships 
 
 
 Guanxi central-, regional- and 
local government institutions 
 Political relationships 
 Ability to utilize Chinese flexibility 
 Land right approvals 
 Relationship with legal entities 
 Uncertainty Avoidance and 
Masculinity/Femininity difference 
 Guanxi central-, regional- and 
local government institutions 
 Political relationships 
 Ability to utilize Chinese flexibility 
 Land right approvals 
 Relationship with legal entities 
 Uncertainty Avoidance and 
Masculinity/Femininity difference 
Opportunities 
 Erdos’ size is hard to imitate 
 Integrate Chinese flexibility 
 Compete in China to strengthen 
global competitiveness 
 Connect to related industries in 
China (Erdos) 
 Uncertainty Avoidance and 
Masculinity/Femininity difference 
 Top political support 
 Build lobby strength 
 Uncertainty Avoidance and 
Masculinity/Femininity difference 
 Top political support 
 Lobby with multiple partners 
 Top political support 
 Trade agreement China-Norway 
 Relative political stability 
 IPR protection 
 Implementation of company 
specific strategy mind-set 
 Top political support 
 Trade agreement China–Norway 
 Relative political stability 
 IPR protection 
 Implementation of company 
specific strategy mind-set 
Threats 
 Current oversupply of microsilica 
 Low price competition from global 
competitors 
 Unfavourable judicial decisions 
 Unfavourable political decisions 
 Changing Norwegian government 
might change trust relationship 
 Low price competition from global 
competitors 
 Similar products in performance 
 Unfavourable judicial decisions 
 Unfavourable political decisions 
 Changing Norwegian government 
might change trust relationship 
 Lobby strength 
 Low price competition from global 
competitors 
 Regional age distribution workers 
 Lobby strength 
 Low price competition from global 
competitors 
 Regional age distribution workers 
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power plant in Inner Mongolia is one example where Elkem Solar can gain from Elkem 
M‟s trust relationship and guanxi with Erdos. 
For the political considerations it should be mandatory for Elkem M managers to attend any 
meeting Erdos attend with political, administrative or judicial representatives as an 
opportunity to build relationships and guanxi towards formal institutions. Investments in 
local infrastructure and a solid HR policy to show corporate social responsibility is also a 
major contributor to a good relationship to these institutions, maybe more in China than in 
many other countries. 
For BM2 a strong focus on procedures to administer multiple partners stands out as a factor 
that might decrease Elkem M‟s performance in China. This might facilitate the lobbying 
capabilities for Elkem, but more attention to each of the factors under BM1 would be 
multiplied with the number of EIJV partners. As a conclusion to this it might be said that 
the transaction cost with several smaller partners might be more costly than the current 
BM1, thus the risks are reduced with several partners. However, the return of investment 
will most likely be reduced in BM2 compared to BM1 if the used research applies to Elkem 
M‟s specific strategic mode in China. Zhu argues that due diligence is not a sufficient 
instrument to ex ante identify appropriate partners, however the approach of this report have 
found evidence that due diligence can be used as an effective and efficient tool if the 
process is conducted after certain criteria. This procedure includes brief screening of many 
possible partners, then select of a few of the best prospects and conduct a deep due 
diligence screening. 
The top political relations and support for Norwegian investments in China is a factor that 
might reduce risks in China. BM3 might create more opportunities for Elkem M in China if 
the strategic mode is considered more important in itself as a competitive advantage 
compared to BM1 and BM2. To achieve an equally good performance as for BM1 the focus 
should be more on knowledge transfer between the Norwegian home management and 
relations to Chinese government bodies. More effort on lobbying is a probable outcome for 
BM3 than the two previous modes. Learning Elkem the Chinese way of business will fall 
upon Chinese Elkem managers if there are no equity partners to learn from and internal 
procedures should be in place to maintain relationships with all external interest holders. 
The implementation of a Norwegian mind-set is in any respect a difficult task in China as 
the culture should be considered for Chinese managers as well. 
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Chinese companies tend to want a win-win situation and seem more eager to continue long 
term strategic relationships partly because it is important to have a good record of stable 
partner experiences to facilitate for easier access to future new partnerships and new 
alliance formations in the Chinese business environment. 
Most of the risks and focus areas from BM3 is applicable to BM4 with the obvious 
difference that there will be no Chinese investors to rely on when cultural specific 
challenges occur. This implies that even more focus should be put in learning Norwegian 
managers the Chinese business environment. 
China has does enforce well drafted contracts written in Chinese more often today than only 
a few years ago, Wolff (2008), Chen (2008), yet there are still some risks of expensive legal 
procedures in some region. But the system is improving rapidly as to the educational level 
of judges and judicial officials. Most conflicts are solved outside the judicial system 
because of the cultural specific notion of harmony, or „the middle way‟ approach to 
conflicts, i.e. the wish to create a win-win situation to keep a long term business relation in 
good terms. The weakness of law enforcement was criticized by national and international 
law experts. Whether law enforcement departments in China deal with every case strictly 
and in time according to law, and how it can risk Elkem‟s business in China. 
Recent policy changes increase flexibility and movement of work-force from region to 
region in China and makes it more likely to increase performance in BM2. This is a slightly 
different conclusion than what Zhu argues in the human asset specificity dimension, Zhu p. 
11. 
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7 Limitations 
This report is by far a full strategy analysis. It should first be seen as an extension to Zhu 
2008, second as a small additional supplement to the process of analysing and reporting a 
full analysis aimed towards Elkem/Elkem Materials strategic decision-making process in 
China. The PESTEL analysis is not a full strategic analysis and should be treated as such, 
included the conclusions and suggested measures for each of the business models included 
in the analysis. 
As pointed out several times, PESTEL should be done in a group environment, preferably 
multi-disciplinary, within Elkem M. Many important issues has not been considered in the 
analysis as it can only be done as an effort by employees from different levels within Elkem 
M and Elkem and with good knowledge also of internal factors relevant to the analysis. 
Many of these factors are hard to grab as an outsider. So this report could be considered as a 
guideline for further strategic analysis, which in any case is an ongoing effort to adapt to an 
ever changing landscape. 
Equity mode Cross-shareholding has not been discussed in this report and would be very 
interesting to discuss and analyse as it may contribute to both performance and ability to 
cooperate between Chinese and Norwegian business cultures. 
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“China is an open country. Chinese people are broad-minded people. Chinese companies are willing to 
cooperate and grow with the world‟s leading peers on the basis of equality and reciprocal benefit.” 
Zong Qinhou, Chairman Wahaha Group 2009 
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